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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The residual income approach to housing affordability is one that looks at what 
different household types can afford to spend on housing after taking into account the 
other necessary expenditures of living. It is an alternative to benchmark measures of 
affordability as used in social housing rent setting in Australia (the 25% rule) or 
assessing the overall affordability in the wider housing market (the 30/40 rule) as 
commonly used by a range of housing affordability researchers in Australia. 
This Positioning Paper does two things. Part A provides an overview, using existing 
literature, of the various semantic, substantive and definitional issues around the 
notion of affordability, leading to an argument in support of the soundness of the 
residual income approach. This overview is set in the historical contexts of 
discussions about affordability measures in the US, UK and Australia. 
Part B is methodological; it shows for various household types and income ranges, 
both for home purchase and rental, how the residual income method can be 
operationalised and its potential policy applications. This is still work in progress and 
there may be minor refinements to the method by the time of the production of the 
Final Report. However, we are confident that the method is sufficiently robust at this 
point to indicate its substantial potential as a problem identification and policy tool. 
As a literature review, Part A of this Positioning Paper may be seen as contributing to 
the broad knowledge base of those interested in affordability research, but does not 
have an explicit policy focus. Those with just a concern for policy alone could extract 
the key information from the executive summary and then move to Part B. 
Part A begins with two frameworks for understanding the key direction and debates in 
the literature. The first is in terms of the semantic and substantive arguments about 
the term ‘housing affordability’ and the second with those around the actual 
measurement of the relationship between housing costs and income, notably the two 
broad and computational approaches ‘ratios’ and ‘difference’, which are the formal 
foundations of measurement. This executive summary focuses on these two 
frameworks emerging from a synthesis of the literature rather than on the literature 
itself. 
Framing analysis of affordability measurement 
The first way of framing analysis about housing affordability measurement is in terms 
of the substantive arguments about ‘housing affordability’. These can be categorised 
as: 
Æ Conceptual rigour v. practical policy implications. 
Æ Housing affordability v. ‘affordable housing’. 
Æ Housing affordability v. ‘affordable rents’ in social housing. 
Æ Housing affordability v. affordable living. 
Æ Housing affordability v. housing standards. 
Æ A normative standard of affordability v. empirical analysis of housing costs in 
relation to incomes. 
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 Conceptual rigour v. practical policy implications 
This section of the paper draws attention to the conflict between the conceptual clarity 
of the affordability standard and the practical policy implications such as recognition of 
potential perverse incentives (if used for rent setting), fiscal constraints, broad 
economic and social goals, and political interests. The section discusses the various 
literatures which had tried to reconcile these demands. 
Housing affordability v. ‘affordable housing’ 
Throughout much of the world, affordability is often expressed in terms of ‘affordable 
housing’. Yet affordability (and lack of affordability) is not an inherent characteristic of 
a housing unit—it is a relationship between housing and people. For some people, all 
housing is affordable, no matter how expensive; for others, no housing is affordable 
unless it is free. ‘Affordable’ housing only can have meaning (and utility) if three 
essential questions are answered: 
1. Affordable to whom? 
2. On what standard of affordability? 
3. For how long? 
In light of the discussion on housing standards, one might also add the question: 
Meeting what physical standard? One of the ways of giving greater precision to the 
term has been the emergence of the affordable housing concept which can relate the 
affordable price or rent more closely to the income of specific income groups. 
Housing affordability v. ‘affordable rents’ in social housing 
Even though social housing (public & non-profit) does not or cannot generate profit for 
its owners, it nonetheless needs to generate sufficient income from residents and 
other sources to be able to cover adequately much or all of the costs of operations 
and, depending upon the financing scheme, repayment of capital costs for 
construction and any subsequent modernisation. This raises the question of to what 
degree household rents purportedly designed for housing affordability are actually 
affordable rents. 
Housing affordability v. affordable living 
A household in an outer urban or regional area may have an affordable dwelling but 
not affordable living, as standard affordability measures do not recognise the trade-
offs between cheap or affordable housing and the commuting costs associated with 
residence in such locations. As Australian cities become more polarised, this issue will 
become more problematic, although the limited work to date has been done in the US 
(Brookings Institution 2006; Center for Housing Policy 2006). The measurement issue 
here is determining the degree to which this is a problem, as many outer urban home 
purchasers and renters live and work in the same area. For these, commuting costs 
are not high at all. 
Housing affordability v. housing standards 
This debate recognises that affordability cannot be divorced from housing deprivation 
and housing standards. If a household is achieving ‘affordability’, but only by virtue of 
living in overcrowded conditions, with insecure tenure or in unsafe or inaccessible 
locations, is that real affordability? While each of these other forms of deprivation is 
logically distinct from lack of affordability, in reality most households who experience 
one or more of these do so because they cannot afford satisfactory dwellings and 
residential environments. Others argue that households may have their standards set 
too high and, if experiencing an affordability problem, it is their choice. The 
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 choice/constraint debate relating to standards has been a major undercurrent of 
housing affordability for many decades. Australia’s popular acceptance of the 30/40 
rule acknowledges this debate in that it assumes any household above the 40th decile 
that has put themselves in a position where their housing costs are in excess of 30 
per cent of their income has done so out of choice. 
A normative standard of affordability v. empirical analysis of housing costs in 
relation to incomes 
Historically, one way of measuring affordability has been to calculate the mean or 
median ratio of shelter expenditures (mortgages & rents) to income, using various 
household expenditure surveys to derive the relevant figures. It has then been 
assumed that because households on average actually spend such a fraction of their 
incomes or shelter, ipso facto this percentage is justified as a standard of what is 
reasonable to spend. 
But is a description of reality an appropriate basis for a standard? Should there be a 
normative concept, an affordability standard with some independent logical or 
theoretical basis, against which households’ actual circumstances can be measured? 
A standard based on what households actually do is tautological. 
Diverse and incompatible definitions of housing affordability 
This section of Part A deals less with detailed conceptualisation and principles than 
with the actual measurement of the relationship between housing costs and income. 
The two broad computational approaches—‘ratios’ and ‘difference’—are the formal 
foundations of the prevailing affordability paradigm and its principal challenger 
respectively. In practice, there appears to be a greater variety of approaches to 
defining housing affordability: 
Æ Categorical: a statement of ability or inability of households to pay for market 
housing, but without a measurement foundation. 
Æ Relative: changes over time in the relationship between housing costs and 
household incomes. 
Æ Subjective: whatever individual households are willing or choose to spend. 
Æ Family budget: monetary standards based on aggregate housing expenditure 
patterns. 
Æ Ratio: maximum acceptable housing cost/income ratios. 
Æ Residual: normative standards of a minimum income required to meet non-
housing needs at a basic level after paying for housing. 
Tautological/categorical 
Categorical, and arguably tautological, statements about affordability but not 
grounded in any reference point are not unusual. For example, affordability is 
‘people’s ability to secure housing, to rent or to buy, based on their ability to pay either 
the rent or the mortgage’. Or households with an affordability problem are those ‘who 
cannot meet the market cost of buying or renting housing from their own resources, i.e. 
those whose housing costs have to be subsidised’. While hinting at the causes of an 
affordability problem, i.e. an income-cost relationship, such statements are 
problematic—they imply a definition of affordability but fail to provide any real 
measure of what it means. 
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 Relative 
The relative approach, widely used by the mortgage lending and real estate industries 
to assess the affordability of the residential sales market, is based upon prototypical 
housing costs, primarily for potential homebuyers. The derived indicators enable two 
or more points in time to be compared as to whether, on average, dwellings for sale 
have become relatively more or less affordable, typically either in relation to median 
income or in constant dollars. 
The relative approach may thus serve a useful descriptive purpose, but provides no 
independent normative standard and uses no distributional data for assessing how 
many and which kinds of households can and cannot afford which properties that are 
for sale. Nor does it provide any basis for assessing ongoing affordability stresses. 
Furthermore, the median multiple measure is particularly problematical because it 
takes no account of purchasing and financing terms that are decisive in determining 
the affordability of dwellings of any given price. 
Subjective 
The third approach rest on the assumption of homo economicus: since households 
are presumably rational utility-maximisers, every household is by definition paying just 
what it can afford for housing. Some may be living in undesirable conditions, some 
may have low incomes that give them few choices, but they make the choice that is 
best for them within their constraints. Thus, from this perspective, housing affordability 
per se has no generalisable meaning; it is neither rationally possible nor socially 
desirable to establish a normative standard of affordability other than individual choice. 
The notion negates the need to measure affordability as it is seen as a subjective 
concept that is different for all households. However, this does not advance the policy 
debate very far. 
Family budget 
The fourth approach to conceptualising housing affordability has based affordability 
standards on a combination of normative judgements and summary measures of what 
households in the aggregate actually spend. This is the basis for the budget standards 
approach and, at one step removed, the residual income method which is the subject 
matter of this study. 
Although every household has its own unique conditions of life, there are historically 
and socially determined notions of what constitutes a minimum adequate or decent 
standard of living. They represent norms around which a range of variations can be 
recognised and about which there certainly may be some philosophical debate. One 
manifestation of this method is the poverty line as a minimum entitlement as to the 
quantity and/or quality of essential goods and services a household could consume. 
The budget standard is another manifestation of this approach and involves 
specification of a ‘market basket’ of essential items. For housing, food and most other 
items, data from consumer expenditure surveys, expert opinion and, in some cases, 
opinion surveys and focus groups are used to establish a minimal standard of type, 
quantity and quality, in a given social context at a given time (the physical standard 
will of course vary by household type, and this qualifier applies to all of the following). 
The physical standard for each item is then priced, and the prices summed to yield a 
total (after-tax) minimal budget. How housing is treated in this process is a source of 
considerable debate, with the general conclusion that the budget standard 
methodology may be able to specify a reasonably precise physical standard for 
housing, but it cannot establish a precise monetary standard. 
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 Ratio 
As an indicator for expressing the relationship between housing costs and incomes, 
the ratio measure has the longest history and widest recognition for assessing 
affordability. Normatively, this approach recognises that what many households pay 
for housing in relation to their income is the result of difficult choices among limited 
and often unsatisfactory alternatives. It asserts that if a household pays more for 
housing than a certain percentage or fraction of its income, then it will not have 
enough income left for other necessities. It usually specifies an explicit ratio of 
housing cost to income as a standard against which households’ actual circumstances 
can be measured. Yet, despite its widespread recognition and acceptance, there is no 
theoretical or logical foundation for the concept and the particular ratio or ratios that 
are used, and moreover it is problematic as it tends to accept the same standard 
irrespective of household type and their different consumption standards. As 
discussed in more detail in Part A, these logical flaws in the ratio approach led 
inexorably to the residual income concept of affordability. 
Residual income 
The residual income approach to affordability recognises that because of housing’s 
distinctive physical attributes in comparison with other necessities, its cost makes the 
largest and least flexible claim on after-tax income for most households, i.e. that non-
housing expenditures are limited by how much income is left after paying for housing. 
This means that a household has a housing affordability problem if it cannot meet its 
non-housing needs at some minimum level of adequacy after paying for housing. The 
appropriate indicator of the tension between housing costs and incomes is thus the 
difference between them—the residual income after paying for housing—rather than 
the ratio. For reasons discussed in Part A, it is a method which addresses many of the 
conceptual and methodological flaws of other methods. However, as Part A reveals, 
the literature not only strengthens the argument for the residual income approach, it 
also helps to illuminate some of the practical tasks in operationalising such a standard. 
Operationalising the residual income model 
Recognising the serious shortcomings of the familiar and widely used ratio approach, 
this paper outlines a residual income method which can differentiate potential 
affordability outcomes for various household types across a range of incomes, both 
for home purchase and rental. We operationalise an ownership and rental model with 
the key features of: 
Æ Different indicators for purchase and rental. 
Æ Affordability measures for a broad range of incomes. 
Æ Affordability for a sample of household types: a single person household and a 
couple with two children. 
Æ Affordability based upon two residual income non-housing standards. 
Æ User-set parameters to test market conditions as well as indexed over time. 
Æ Multiple indicators of affordability for different uses, e.g. price points, assessing 
spatial constraints in the housing markets, understanding market dynamics. 
In the Final Report these features will be expanded to more household types and for a 
broader range of applications, e.g. rent setting in social housing. 
There are three major practical issues that have to be dealt with in translating the 
residual income logic into an operational affordability standard. These are: first, how to 
specify the monetary level of a minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter items 
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 other than taxes, second, how to scale this standard for various types of households, 
and third, how to deal with personal taxes and benefits to create a disposable income 
appropriate for each household type. 
For this study, the ‘low cost’ and ‘modest but adequate’ indicative budgets developed 
by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) at the University of New South Wales 
(Saunders et al. 1998) have been used to devise and apply operational residual 
income affordability scales. 
The second practical issue involves translating a specified qualitative standard of 
adequacy for non-housing items into quantitative monetary amounts that differ by 
household size and type. Again, as detailed low cost budgets have been derived by 
the SPRC for 20 household types and modest but adequate budgets for 26 types, this 
data base has been used, but only for two household types: single persons and 
couples with two children. The Final Report will provide details on more household 
types. 
Having dealt with the problem of expenditures, the next methodological challenge for 
any income group is the matter of taxes and benefits. The ratio approach has always 
manifested a great deal of confusion and inconsistency as to whether the standard 
should be based upon gross household income or disposable income. By contrast, 
the residual income approach is unambiguous: because the non-housing standard 
provided by the indicative budgets is a consumption standard, it is a household’s 
disposable income that faces the tension between housing and non-housing 
necessities. Thus, for each income level and household type the appropriate tax and 
Income Support payments, including in the case of rents, rent assistance, has to be 
factored in. 
What is left when relevant expenditure (whether low cost or modest) is deducted from 
the relevant income for each household type is the amount that can be spent on 
housing without having an affordability problem. Because of the very different 
methodology of the residual approach compared to the ratio method, it is likely to 
produce very different affordability outcomes for different household types, which 
potentially has important policy implications. 
Part B applies the model for both purchasers and renters to different housing market 
or policy issues. First, there is a big difference in purchasing affordability for the two 
household types. Compared to a family on the same income, a single person willing to 
live on the modest but adequate budget standard can afford to pay much more per 
week on housing expenditures than indicated by the 30 per cent of income benchmark 
method. This means that a single income household on a reasonable income has 
more ability to enter the home purchase market. The additional living expenses of 
households with children constrain their ability to borrow and therefore afford housing 
even in lower price areas. This analysis is consistent with the findings of Hulse et al. 
(2010) who, in their research on changes in low-moderate income home purchasing 
patterns, noted a sharp decline in the number of low-moderate income purchasers 
who are households with children and a very big increase in the proportion who are 
single person, single income households, with these changes being much greater 
than those explainable by demographic change alone. In short, the model is more 
nuanced to household type and their affordability problems. 
Second and relatedly, the model provides an explanation of how some low-moderate 
income homebuyers are able to afford the high prices of recent years, particularly if 
they are first-time purchasers who do not have more than a minimum deposit. For 
some household types, e.g. single persons above an income of $30 000, there is 
greater capacity to afford these prices than the benchmark model would suggest. The 
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 household might be living modestly to achieve the latter loan size but, provided that 
there were no other issues which affected their expenditures (e.g. maintenance 
payments to children of a previous marriage), they could afford the repayments if this 
is how they set their priorities. This greater capacity to borrow explains why dwelling 
prices which look non-affordable on the benchmark method are actually affordable. 
The model provides a better understanding of housing market dynamics. 
Third, the analysis also suggests the notion of price points for affordable housing for 
low-moderate income purchasers. Thus, for any household type and income level it is 
possible to specify what may be the appropriate price or rent points to aim at to avoid 
an affordability problem. This could be a useful guideline for the National Rental 
Affordability Scheme or other affordable housing. 
Fourth, the model can be used to get some understanding of the spatial patterning of 
the housing market. Part B applies the mortgage capacity for a given household type 
using the residual income model to the Valuer General’s unit record sales data for 
Melbourne. By this method it is possible to determine where different households for 
any given income can afford to purchase. Applied to Residential Tenancies Bond 
Authority data, the same method shows how much rental property is affordable for 
different households. In short, it enables a better understanding of what is happening 
in the market spatially and reveals that low-moderate income households can still 
purchase or rent, but their choices are highly spatially constrained. 
This Positioning Paper is not comprehensive in the applications the model can be put 
to, but it suggests the broad directions. The Final Report will look at more household 
types as well as include new applications, e.g. relevance for social housing rent 
setting and comparing Australia’s affordability performance with international housing 
markets. But even at this point, the paper illustrates (a) that the work requires a level 
of methodological detail not hitherto undertaken in equivalent studies in Australia or 
internationally and (b) the model’s potential usefulness in providing a critical 
framework for thinking about affordability and for new policy debate. 
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 PART A: LITERATURE REVIEW 
1 INTRODUCTION—LITERATURE REVIEW 
This Positioning Paper seeks to provide a greater understanding of the residual 
income approach to measuring housing affordability. It does so in two ways. Part A 
provides an overview, using existing literature, of the various semantic, substantive 
and definitional issues around the notion of affordability, leading to an argument in 
support of the soundness of the residual income approach. This overview is set in the 
historical contexts of discussions about affordability measures in the US, UK, Australia 
and several other countries. This part of the paper can be seen as a complement to 
the associated AHURI paper by Gabriel et al. (2005) which overviewed affordability 
measures used or contested in the Australian context but only gave fleeting attention 
to the residual income measure. This part is detailed and at times complex, but is 
important reading if we are to understand that affordability measurement and its policy 
applications are grounded in contestation and debate. For readers who want to get 
just an overview of the issues, the executive summary may be sufficient reading. 
Part B is methodological; it shows for various household types and income ranges, 
both for home purchase and rental, how the residual income method can be 
operationalised and its potential policy applications. This is still work in progress and 
there may be minor refinements to the method by the time of the production of the 
Final Report. However, we are confident that the method is sufficiently robust at this 
point to indicate its substantial potential as a problem identification and policy tool. 
Housing affordability has been an enduring concern for consumers and governments 
for over a century but, in the face of rising house prices and rents in recent decades, 
has taken on even greater visibility. But what is housing affordability? Most 
fundamentally, it is an expression of the social and material experiences of 
households, in relation to their individual housing situations. Affordability expresses 
the challenge each faces in balancing the cost of their actual or potential housing, on 
the one hand, and their non-housing expenditures, on the other, within the constraints 
of their income. 
Public policy and the interpretation of individual experiences are mediated through 
generalised analytical indicators and normative standards of housing affordability that 
transcend unique individual experience; the personal trouble of a household is 
transformed into a social problem, with the individual experience often lost in this 
process. Generalised indicators and standards make it possible to arrive at 
conclusions—potentially contentious, to be sure—about the overall extent of 
affordability problems and needs, as well as their distribution socially and 
geographically. They also provide an important foundation stone for the (at least 
somewhat rational) formulation, implementation and evaluation of policies and 
practices that deal with affordability. 
In much of the developed world, especially in the English-speaking countries, there is 
widespread use and acceptance of the ratio of housing cost to income as the 
appropriate indicator of affordability and of the simple ‘rule of thumb’ ratio standard 
(25% of income until the early 1980s, 30% since then) for assessing housing 
affordability problems as well as for determining eligibility and payment levels, 
explicitly for publicly subsidised rental housing and somewhat more loosely for other 
rental and ownership programs and financing. The ratio paradigm persists despite 
considerable critical discussion that began in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
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 in the UK in the early 1990s, and in Australia in the late 1990s, in presenting and 
applying an alternative residual income approach. 
This paper begins with an overview of various issues around the meaning of housing 
affordability, leading to an argument in support of the conceptual soundness of the 
residual income model. The residual income concept is then set into the historical 
context of US, UK and Australian debates about affordability measures. In the US, 
during the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s, there was a considerable body of 
literature devoted to arguments in support of a residual income alternative to the 
conventional ratio approach, culminating in operational models and applications to 
measuring affordability problems, but apparently with no practical impact on housing 
policies. Thereafter, the arguments and applications were carried forward, largely by a 
single researcher, until the past decade when some renewed interest emerged. In the 
UK, in the early 1990s, there began insightful discussion among research and 
advocacy communities about the need for greater clarity about the meaning of 
housing affordability and the relative merits of various conceptual approaches, with 
particular attention to the residual income model, which was placed on a strong 
theoretical foundation. Until several years ago, this work seems to have unfolded 
independently, unaware of the work that had been done in the US. In Australia, active 
interest in the residual income approach began in the late 1990s, informed by both the 
US and UK literature. While not providing further theoretical or conceptual advances, 
in recent years Australian analysts have made important methodological contributions 
and practical policy proposals, placing Australia in the forefront of residual income 
work. Finally, it should be noted that some analysts in continental Europe and Asia 
have recently also begun applying the approach. 
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 2 THE LOGIC OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 
2.1 Semantic and substantive issues about the term ‘housing 
affordability’ 
One finds several types of tensions in the literature on housing affordability, including, 
but not necessarily limited to, the following: 
Æ Conceptual rigour v. practical policy implications. 
Æ Housing affordability v. ‘affordable housing’. 
Æ Housing affordability v. ‘affordable rents’ in social housing. 
Æ Housing affordability v. housing standards. 
Æ A normative standard of affordability v. empirical analysis of housing costs in 
relation to incomes. 
2.1.1 Conceptual rigour v. practical policy implications 
Housing policy inevitably is shaped by factors other than conceptual clarity of the 
affordability standard, e.g. potential perverse incentives, fiscal constraints, broad 
economic and social goals, and political interests. Design of affordability indicators on 
the other hand requires rigorous and sound conceptualisation, including some notion 
of an affordability standard as well as the consideration of methodological issues, 
such as data availability quality and appropriateness. Reconciling these demands is 
not easy. 
Hulchanski (1995) clarified the different policy and research uses of an affordability 
measure. While limiting his discussion to the ratio standard, he has made a valuable 
contribution and become widely cited for identifying and critically examining six ways 
in which housing cost to income ratios have been used: 
1. Description of household expenditures. 
2. Analysis of trends and comparison of different household types. 
3. Administration of public housing by defining eligibility criteria and subsidy levels in 
rent-geared-to-income housing. 
4. Definition of housing need for public policy purposes. 
5. Prediction of the ability of a household to pay the rent or mortgage. 
6. As part of the selection criteria in the decision to rent or provide a mortgage. 
Hulchanski has divided this list into two categories and presented sophisticated 
arguments about their validity and utility that he summarises as follows: 
The first three uses—description, analysis and administration—can be 
considered quite valid and helpful when used properly by housing researchers 
and administrators. ‘Used properly’ means that the research methods and the 
statistical analysis techniques are properly carried out, i.e. no significant 
methodological errors are made. This leads to valid and reliable descriptive 
and analytic statements about the housing expenditures of the different types 
of households being studied. This type of description and analysis of 
household expenditure patterns can also be helpful in defining administrative 
rules about eligibility for means-tested housing programmes … 
The improper and inappropriate use of housing expenditure-to-income ratios, 
leading to invalid and unreliable results, is due to a variety of theoretical and 
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 conceptual errors. Uses four, five and six—definition, prediction, and 
selection—are all invalid uses for they fail to measure what they claim to be 
measuring, even if the research methods and the statistical analysis 
techniques are properly carried out. In short the conceptual and 
methodological problems in the housing cost to income ratio method, i.e. the 
benchmark method, preclude its use for these policy purposes. 
Strikingly, though, and despite quoting a critique of the ratio approach in a paper by 
Stone (1990) that advanced the residual income approach, Hulchanski makes no 
explicit mention at all of the residual income concept, let alone putting it forward as a 
possible alternative for definition, prediction and selection. 
2.1.2 Housing affordability v. ‘affordable housing’ 
Throughout much of the world, affordability is often expressed in terms of ‘affordable 
housing’. Yet affordability (and lack of affordability) is not an inherent characteristic of 
a housing unit—it is a relationship between housing and people. For some people, all 
housing is affordable, no matter how expensive; for others, no housing is affordable 
unless it is free. ‘Affordable’ housing only can have meaning (and utility) if three 
essential questions are answered: 
1. Affordable to whom? 
2. On what standard of affordability? 
3.  For how long? 
In light of the discussion in the section below on housing standards, one might also 
add the question: Meeting what physical standard? 
In the US, before the 1980s, subsidised housing (private and public) was referred to 
as ‘low income housing’ and ‘low and moderate income housing’, with explicit 
definitions of ‘low income’ and ‘moderate income’. Although such terms and definitions 
are still used in determining eligibility under various housing policies and programs in 
the US,1 in the 1980s the term ‘affordable housing’ came into vogue as part of the 
retreat from public responsibility for the plight of the poor and as affordability 
challenges moved up the income distribution ladder. The term has since achieved 
international stature, yet in most contexts still lacks precise and consistent definition. It 
typically encompasses not only social housing and low income housing, but also 
financially assisted housing for middle income households who find it difficult to 
purchase in the private speculative market. Growing interest in the concept of 
affordable housing as more than just a social housing one by the development and 
building industry has, at least in Australia, required greater specification of the concept 
and to this purpose there has been some discussion of price points. These are the 
‘affordable’ prices or rents for different household income levels, but identifying such 
price points still requires making certain methodological assumptions of the type 
addressed in this paper. In Australia the policy environment, notably the National 
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS), has also widened the use of the affordable 
housing term as such. NRAS-funded housing has now been labelled ‘affordable 
housing’. However, a far more accurate and appropriate term for NRAS and other 
types of ‘affordable housing’ would be ‘below-market housing’. This term properly 
                                                
1 The term ‘moderate income’ is one for which there is no longer a precise definition for national policy in 
the US, although some state governments do have explicit definitions. But ‘low income’, ‘very low income’ 
and ‘extremely low income’ are defined by federal statutes and regulations. Each year the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development publishes the income limits for each of these definitions, adjusted for 
household size, for every geographical area of the US. See Stone (1994) for a critique.  
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 denotes identifiable segments of the housing stock, without making any unjustifiable 
general claim of affordability. 
2.1.3 Housing affordability v. ‘affordable rents’ in social housing 
While this particular confusion may seem to be rather like the previous one, it has its 
own specific character and issues. Even though social housing (public & non-profit) 
does not or cannot generate profit for its owners, it nonetheless needs to generate 
sufficient income from residents and other sources to be able to cover adequately 
much or all of the costs of operations and, depending upon the financing scheme, 
repayment of capital costs for construction and any subsequent modernisation. 
In Australia, the commonly used 25 per cent household rent in social housing is called 
an affordable rent, while the UK central government in a recent rent restructuring 
process created an expectation that social landlords (both councils & housing 
associations) establish ‘affordable rents’, but also harmonise difference across 
providers and set rents that reflect the attributes of the property (DETR 2000; Reeves 
2005). However, declaring a goal or obligation to set ‘affordable rents’ or calling a rent 
affordable as in the Australian context will not necessarily either assure that they are 
truly affordable to low-income households or yield sufficient rental income for the 
housing to be economically viable or both. 
2.1.4 Housing affordability v. affordable living 
As cities increasingly gentrify and the cheapest housing is to be found on the urban 
fringe or in regional towns, there is a growing concern that standard affordability 
measures do not recognise the trade-offs between cheap or affordable housing and 
the commuting or travel costs associated with residence in such locations. A 
household in such a location may have an affordable dwelling but not affordable living. 
As Australian cities become more polarised (Baum & Gleeson 2010; Hulse et al. 
2010), this issue will become more problematic. The limited work to date has been 
done in the US (Brookings Institution 2006; Center for Housing Policy 2006) although, 
by default, research on key worker housing (Randolph et al. 2007) confronts this issue 
as one of the reasons occupational shortages exist in inner city locations is the costs 
of transport for workers unable to afford inner city housing. The measurement issue 
here is determining the degree to which this is a problem, as many outer urban home 
purchasers and renters live and work in the same area. For these, commuting costs 
are not high at all. 
2.1.5 Housing affordability v. housing standards 
Housing deprivation can take a variety of forms, of which lack of affordability is only 
one. Households may live in housing that fails to meet physical standards of ‘decency’, 
in overcrowded conditions, with insecure tenure or in unsafe or inaccessible locations. 
While each of these other forms of deprivation is logically distinct from lack of 
affordability, in reality most households who experience one or more of these do so 
because they cannot afford satisfactory dwellings and residential environments. 
If other forms of housing deprivation are largely due to the affordability squeeze, in 
measuring the extent of affordability problems how should we account for those 
households who seem not to have an affordability problem (as measured on some 
standard of affordability), yet do experience one or more other forms of housing 
deprivation? Simply put, if the cost of obtaining satisfactory dwellings and residential 
environments within the same housing market area exceeds what such households 
could afford, then they reasonably should be considered to have an affordability 
problem, even though this is not revealed by application of an economic affordability 
standard. Only if such a household could afford adequate housing—and if such 
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 housing actually is available—might they reasonably be considered to be living in 
inadequate housing by choice. Although housing deprivation is complex and can take 
various forms, standards for most forms of deprivation are fairly well established; 
hence the measurement of deprivation and its relationship to affordability is, in 
principle, reasonably tractable. 
On the other hand, can it not be argued that those households who do appear to have 
an affordability problem, yet are ‘over-housed’, might not have an affordability problem 
if they were not over-housed? This question is the obverse of the one in the previous 
paragraph and could in principle be answered by a similar analytical technique. The 
difficulty, of course, is: What is a reasonable, broadly acceptable operational definition 
of over-housed? Although the relationship between the number of people in a 
household and the number of bedrooms (or total number of rooms) is widely used as 
an operational definition, this tends to be simplistic. For example, a modern garden 
apartment consisting of two tiny bedrooms, a small living room and a minuscule 
kitchen could easily have less than half the usable space of a once-luxurious Victorian 
flat with one large bedroom, a good sized living room and dining room, and an eat-in 
kitchen. Is it reasonable to consider a widow living in the former to be over-housed 
because the flat has two bedrooms, but not in the latter because it has one bedroom? 
Of greater subtlety, and as significant for assessing affordability: Should households 
be considered over-housed if they have rooms for anticipated additional children, for 
overnight visits from family and friends, for study or hobbies, or for home-based 
business or employment? And, more importantly, can we assume it is choice driving 
the over-consumption? As various studies on the changes in the rental stock over 
time have shown (e.g. Yates & Wulff 2000; Wulff et al. 2001), much of the lowest cost 
stock is occupied by higher income earners, forcing lower income earners to accept 
what they can get. Thus, the number of households who appear to have an 
affordability problem, but would not have such a problem were they not ‘over-housed’, 
is likely to be considerably lower based on application of some flexible standard rather 
than a simplistic person/bedroom (or person/room) definition. 
In sum, housing affordability is not really separable from housing standards. An 
analysis of the extent and distribution of affordability problems that takes into account 
other forms of housing deprivation would increase the number, while adjustment for 
over-housing would decrease the number of households determined to have a ‘true’ 
affordability problem. Because of these offsetting tendencies, and the difficulties of 
definition, ideally housing affordability studies should be iterative, i.e. applying an 
economic affordability standard in the first instance, while exploring ways of 
enhancing the precision of the analysis to account for under-housing and over-
housing. 
Lerman and Reeder (1987) and Thalmann (1999, 2003) have developed and applied 
such ‘quality-based’ measures which classify a household as having an affordability 
problem, not on the basis of their actual housing cost in relation to income, but what it 
would cost to obtain housing of a basic physical standard within a given local housing 
market. Lerman and Reeder developed their model using the ratio standard; 
Thalmann used a ratio standard in his first paper (1999), but a residual income 
standard in the later paper (2003). Both limited their analyses to renters because of 
the difficulty in consistently defining and measuring homeowner occupancy costs. 
Focusing on rental housing units in the US that pass certain physical standards of 
adequacy, Lerman and Reeder determine statistically the minimum hedonic rent for 
units of each size (number of bedrooms) within a given census region and city 
population size, which they have called the ‘minimally adequate’ rent. They then 
determine the appropriate housing unit size for a household of a given size based on 
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 Section 8 regulations, referring to the minimally adequate rent for such a household 
as the ‘predicted rent’. On this basis, if the predicted rent for a given household type is 
no more than 30 per cent of their income, then—according to Lerman and Reeder’s 
logic—the household does not have an affordability problem, even if their actual rent 
exceeds 30 per cent of income. From their perspective, a household in the latter 
circumstance has, as they put it, ‘a strong taste for housing’, i.e. is choosing to spend 
more than 30 per cent. 
The weakness in this assertion is that, while it may be true for some relatively high 
income households, it is not necessarily true for all or even most households, 
especially those of low income. Some households paying over 30 per cent of income 
might be quite willing to move into minimally adequate units to reduce their housing 
costs, but those units may not in fact be available: they are likely to be occupied 
already as illustrated by the Australian research referred to above, they may be in 
inaccessible or undesirable locations, they may be effectively off limits to some people 
because of discrimination, or relocation costs may be high economically and/or 
socially. Hence, this model, which regards as ‘misclassified’ all households who are 
determined to have a ‘conventional’ affordability problem but not a ‘quality-based’ 
affordability problem, tends to exaggerate the magnitude of such misclassification. 
When it is all boiled down, the assumption that sits behind this study is that there can 
be no subjective and normative-based minimum housing shelter standard of 
affordability. There can be a minimum standard of occupancy, such as the Canadian 
occupancy standard, and there can be minimum conditions standards as defined 
though planning and building regulations, but there can be no affordability standard. 
Affordability measurement has to be household type specific and emerges as a 
residual of other expenditures. 
2.1.6 A normative standard of affordability v. empirical analysis of housing 
costs in relation to incomes 
Studies of consumer expenditures have been carried out in Europe and North 
America since the late 19th century, yielding considerable information about how 
households have spent their incomes for housing and other items (e.g. Feins & Lane 
1981; Stone 1993; Pelletiere 2008). One way of summarising the data on housing 
costs has been to calculate the mean or median ratio of shelter expenditures to 
income. It has then been assumed that because households on average actually 
spend such a fraction of their incomes on shelter, ipso facto this percentage is justified 
as a standard of what is reasonable to spend.2 Rapkin (1957, p.8) rather whimsically 
noted this confusion when he wrote: 
No discussion of the rent-income ratio can begin without a reference to the 
familiar belief that one month’s rent should approximate one week’s salary. It 
has never been quite clear to me whether this statement purports to be a 
statistical observation or whether it is a ‘folkloristic’ exhortation to husbandry. 
Baer (1976) made a useful contribution by explicitly distinguishing between an 
indicator, which measures empirically the relationship between, say, housing costs 
and incomes, and a standard, which specifies normatively the appropriate value or 
values that an indicator should take or not exceed. As he stated with regard to 
housing affordability (p.383): 
Given the variety of circumstances facing different households, rules of thumb 
about the percentage of income to be devoted to housing can be extremely 
                                                
2 The same confusion could, in principle, arise with residual incomes rather than ratios. It just happens 
that the ratio indicator has for the most part been unquestioned. 
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 misleading in individual cases and therefore in aggregate data as well. 
Although generally recognized, the dilemma has largely defied attempts to 
establish appropriate housing standards. 
To illuminate the issue further: Feins and Lane (1981) and Yip (1995), for example, 
carried out very extensive empirical work on the relationship of housing expenditures 
to incomes in the US and England respectively. In both instances, they recognised 
explicitly the distinction between indicators and standards. Yet they, as well as Baer 
(1976, p.384), ultimately used empirical findings on expenditures as the basis for their 
normative standards. To be sure, all of these authors rejected the notion of a single 
normative standard for all household types. Nonetheless, their proposed standards 
were derived from actual expenditure patterns of various subsets of the population. 
In reality, what most households actually pay for housing is not what they realistically 
can ‘afford’: many pay more, while some pay less, whether measured in money or as 
a percentage of income. Who pays more and who pays less than they realistically can 
afford is of course not random, but correlated with economic and social circumstances. 
As a normative concept, an affordability standard must have some independent 
logical or theoretical basis, against which households’ actual circumstances can be 
measured. Otherwise the standard is tautological, or arbitrary, or affordability is purely 
subjective. 
2.2 Diverse and incompatible definitions of housing 
affordability 
Mathematically, the relationship between housing costs and incomes can be 
computed as a ratio or a difference. These two computational approaches are the 
formal foundations of the prevailing affordability paradigm and its principal challenger 
respectively. In practice, there appears to be a greater variety of approaches to 
defining housing affordability: 
Æ Categorical: a statement of ability or inability of households to pay for market 
housing, but without a measurement foundation. 
Æ Relative: changes over time in the relationship between housing costs and 
household incomes. 
Æ Subjective: whatever individual households are willing or choose to spend. 
Æ Family budget: monetary standards based on aggregate housing expenditure 
patterns. 
Æ Ratio: maximum acceptable housing cost/income ratios. 
Æ Residual: normative standards of a minimum income required to meet non-
housing needs at a basic level after paying for housing. 
2.2.1 Categorical 
Categorical statements about affordability that are not grounded in any reference point 
are not unusual. For example, affordability is ‘people’s ability to secure housing, to 
rent or to buy, based on their ability to pay either the rent or the mortgage’. Or 
households with an affordability problem are those ‘who cannot meet the market cost 
of buying or renting housing from their own resources, i.e. those whose housing costs 
have to be subsidised’.3 While hinting at the causes of an affordability problem, i.e. an 
                                                
3 These two statements appeared several years ago on the public record in the UK. The authors shall 
nonetheless remain anonymous to avoid embarrassing them. While they might claim that the statements 
are taken out of context, the contexts do not dispel their essentially tautological character.  
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 income-cost relationship, such statements are problematic—they imply a definition of 
affordability, but fail to provide any real measure of what it means. 
2.2.2 Relative 
The relative approach, widely used by the mortgage lending and real estate industries 
to assess the affordability of the residential sales market, is based upon prototypical 
housing costs, primarily for potential homebuyers. The derived indicators enable two 
or more points in time to be compared as to whether, on average, dwellings for sale 
have become relatively more or less affordable, typically either in relation to median 
income or in constant dollars. The technical sophistication of such affordability 
measures does vary, with considerable discussion as to the most appropriate 
definitions of housing cost and income to use in constructing the measure, as well as 
the implications of different cost and income definitions (e.g. Weicher 1977; Linneman 
& Megbolugbe 1992; Pannell & Williams 1994). The most widely used Australian 
version is the Housing Industry Association/Commonwealth Bank of Australia Housing 
Affordability Index (see Figure 1 below). There is no absolute measure or standard 
such as 30 per cent, but rather the affordability story is told by comparing the present 
with the past, with a lower index indicating lower affordability. This measure is in effect 
an application of the ratio approach. 
Figure 1: HIA/CBA Housing Affordability Index, May 2010 
 
Source: HIA Commonwealth Bank affordability report 
The HIA/CBA approach computes the ratio of household disposable income as 
reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics to the income needed to qualify for a 
mortgage on a median dwelling, as calculated from a census of all dwellings financed 
by the Commonwealth Bank and assuming a 20 per cent down payment and the 
prevailing interest rate for a 25-year mortgage loan. The percentage of income to 
mortgage ratio for March 1985 (17.3%) was multiplied by 100 to yield an index 
number (117.3) and this time period has become the reference to measure 
affordability subsequently. 
The most widely cited relative measures in the US are those of the National 
Association of Realtors (NAR) and the Joint Center for Housing Studies. The NAR 
(2005) approach computes the ratio of ‘the median family income as reported by the 
US Bureau of the Census’ to the income needed to qualify for a mortgage on ‘the 
national median-priced existing single-family home as calculated by NAR … assuming 
a 20 per cent down payment’ and the prevailing interest rate for 30-year mortgage 
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 loans. The ratio is multiplied by 100 to yield an index number, such that ‘a value of 
100 means that a family with the median income has exactly enough income to qualify 
for a mortgage on a median-priced home’. An index below 100 implies that a median 
income family has insufficient income to qualify for a median-priced existing single-
family home, while a higher index implies more than sufficient income to qualify. 
‘Qualification’, though, assumes a conventional ratio standard: ‘the monthly P&I 
payment cannot exceed 25 per cent of a [sic] the median family monthly income’. That 
is, the NAR measure is really an application of the ratio approach, not a conceptually 
distinct approach.4 
The Joint Center, by contrast, computes a set of indicators without reference to any 
normative standard. For homebuyers, they compute the before-tax and after-tax 
monthly mortgage payment on the median-priced existing single-family home (from 
NAR), assuming ‘a 30-year mortgage with 10 per cent down’ (Joint Center 2004, p.31, 
Table A-1). They also compute median contract rent and median gross rents. These 
amounts are presented in constant dollars for each year, thereby providing a true 
relative measure of prototypical housing costs. Their affordability indicators are all 
ratio measures: the prototypical homebuyer costs as a percentage of median 
homeowner income, and prototypical renter costs as a percentage of median renter 
income. 
Another variation on the relative approach is the median multiple measure, widely 
used by the real estate and lending industries in many countries and across countries 
(Demographia 2010). The indicator computes the ratio of the median price of for-sale 
houses in a given market area to median annual household income as the indicator of 
affordability for that market. The computed indicators are then compared across 
markets at various geographical scales. Normatively, an indicator of 3.0 or less is 
defined as ‘affordable’, with higher thresholds defined as ‘moderately’, ‘seriously’ and 
‘severely’ unaffordable (Demographia 2010, p.9). 
The relative approaches may thus serve a useful descriptive purpose, but provide no 
independent normative standard and use no distributional data for assessing how 
many and which kinds of households can and cannot afford which properties that are 
for sale. Nor do they provide any basis for assessing possible affordability stresses of 
owner-occupiers in their current dwellings, although the Joint Center’s renter ratios do 
provide broad-gauged indicators of renter stress. Furthermore, the median multiple 
measure is particularly problematical because it takes no account of purchasing and 
financing terms that are decisive in determining the affordability of houses of any 
given price. 
2.2.3 Subjective 
The third approach rests on the assumption of homo economicus: since households 
are presumably rational utility-maximisers, every household is by definition paying just 
what it can afford for housing. Some may be living in undesirable conditions, some 
may have low incomes that give them few choices, but they make the choice that is 
best for them within their constraints. Thus, from this perspective, housing affordability 
per se has no generalisable meaning; it is neither rationally possible nor socially 
desirable to establish a normative standard of affordability other than individual choice. 
As a memorandum on ‘affordable housing’ submitted to a UK Parliamentary Select 
Committee bluntly stated (UK Parliament 2002; Memorandum AFH 20, p.2): ‘The 
concept of affordability, of whatever commodity, is essentially subjective.’ 
                                                
4 Treskon and Pelletiere (2004) have similarly analysed renter affordability, using median gross rent, 
median renter income and the 30 per cent of income ratio standard. 
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 More sophisticated versions of this perspective do recognise that the degree of 
financial flexibility does increase with income. Kempson, for example, has argued 
(1993, pp.26–7): 
… people differ in the way they allocate their money. Some choose to spend 
more on their housing and cut back on other expenditure; while others keep 
their housing costs low in order to spend more on other things. The higher the 
income the less need there is for such choices. 
Linneman and Megbolugbe (1992 p.388) expressed this perspective particularly 
pointedly. Although they acknowledged a ‘real’ affordability problem among low 
income households, while claiming that it is ‘primarily a problem of income 
inadequacy’, they asserted, in response to widespread anguish about the cost of 
achieving homeownership (p.388), that housing affordability is ‘an issue manufactured 
by middle-class and affluent young adults with ever growing expectations’. 
While no-one could disagree that higher income households have considerable 
discretion about how to allocate their resources between housing and other items, and 
hence for them affordability may be quite subjective, households at the lower end of 
the income distribution are not simply choosing freely between housing and other 
needs. Rather, housing costs tend to make the first claim on disposable income, so 
that such households have little discretion in what they can spend on non-housing 
items. 
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that ‘subjectivity’ of affordability is not only not 
universal, it is not even a continuum that increases with income. Instead, there is a 
threshold above which affordability may become increasingly subjective. The 
important questions are then: what is that threshold or transition zone below which 
affordability is not subjective, and how to define and measure objective affordability 
below that threshold. These questions are not addressed within this perspective. 
2.2.4 Family budget 
The fourth approach to conceptualising housing affordability has based affordability 
standards on a combination of normative judgements and summary measures of what 
households in the aggregate actually spend. In practice, this has formed the basis for 
the ratio approach. It has also provided the basis for the budget standards approach 
of a standardised monetary amount for housing. Since the latter can be understood as 
a purely income-based standard of affordability, it deserves attention here as a distinct 
approach. 
Although every household has its own unique conditions of life, there do exist 
historically and socially-determined notions of what constitutes a minimum, adequate, 
or decent standard of living. They represent norms around which a range of variations 
can be recognised and about which there certainly may be some philosophical debate. 
While the experience of ‘poverty’ is recognised as more than just the inability to 
secure a socially-determined minimum quantity and/or quality of essential goods and 
services, measurable material deprivation is certainly a central element in poverty. 
Furthermore, in societies where most basic goods and services are commodities, it is 
possible, at least in principle, to determine the monetary cost of achieving such a 
basic material level. This budget standards approach to poverty and income adequacy 
has a long and honourable history (e.g. Expert Committee on Family Budget 
Revisions 1980; Bradshaw et al. 1987; Oldfield & Yu 1993; Ruggles 1990; Bradshaw 
1993; Citro & Michael 1995; Parker 1998; Saunders et al. 1998; Bernstein et al. 2000; 
Bradshaw & Sainsbury 2000; Pelletiere 2008). 
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 The budget standards approach involves specification of a ‘market basket’ of essential 
items. For housing, food and most other items, data from consumer expenditure 
surveys, expert opinion and, in some cases, opinion surveys and focus groups are 
used to establish a minimal standard of type, quantity and quality, in a given social 
context at a given time (the physical standard will of course vary by household type, 
and this qualifier applies to all of the following). The physical standard for each item is 
then priced, and the prices summed to yield a total (after-tax) minimal budget. 
If the budget amounts for housing specified in the standard budgets really do 
represent the amount of income needed for essentially any household of a given type 
to obtain socially defined minimally adequate housing, then housing affordability has 
no independent meaning: in principle, any household with an income no less than the 
total budget should be able to meet all of its basic needs, including housing, at the 
physical quantity and quality represented by the budget standard. 
There are, however, conceptual problems in the treatment of housing costs in the 
budget standards methodology due to their inherent nature and variability. While the 
budget standard methodology is well conceptualised and operationalised for other 
items, it is flawed with regard to housing. The issue is revealed by contrasting the 
budget standard approach and implications for food with that of housing. 
Given the nature of food items—low price variance and high supply elasticity—
essentially any household could, in principle, meet the physical food standard with the 
amount represented by the specific monetary standard, at least within a particular 
geographical region. Housing, by contrast, is highly heterogeneous. Because it is 
bulky, durable and tied to land, it shows high price variance and low elasticity of 
supply, even within a given market area. How then to price the minimum standard for 
housing? If prices are determined for a sample of housing units meeting the minimum 
physical standard, the price distribution has a large variance. Which point on the 
distribution should then be selected for the monetary standard for housing? 
If a very low cost is selected (say, the midpoint of the lowest third of the distribution of 
rents for private market housing, as was the standard in the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics lower standard budgets), then most households, despite their best efforts, 
will not be able to obtain physically adequate housing at the monetary standard—
unless perchance there were to be an extraordinarily large supply of physically 
adequate housing priced barely above this cost threshold. That is, most would need 
income above the total specified by the monetary budget standard in order to meet 
the minimum physical standard. If, on the other hand, the monetary standard for 
housing were to be set closer to the midpoint of the price distribution, such as the 40th 
percentile of rents for physically standard units, which is the definition of ‘fair market 
rent’ computed by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2002) and 
used in recent US budget standards (e.g. Bernstein et al. 2000), then some 
households are able to spend less than the monetary standard for housing and hence 
need less income than the total budget, through no virtue of their own, while others 
would have to spend more, though not as many as with a lower point on the 
distribution. 
In sum, housing is unique; the budget standard methodology may be able to specify a 
reasonably precise physical standard for housing, but it cannot establish a precise 
monetary standard. 5  Furthermore, in terms of policy, this means that housing 
                                                
5 While difficult, it is not impossible to specify what constitutes a unit that is minimally adequate 
physically, and it would be possible to determine the hedonic price of these minimal physical 
characteristics. However, because housing is tied to location, which of course cannot be standardised, 
actual dwelling unit prices—reflecting local demand and supply conditions—will show large variance, 
even controlling for physical characteristics. Furthermore, because housing is so heterogeneous with 
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 affordability problems cannot be explained as just income problems. General and 
standardised Income Support alone would be neither efficient nor equitable for solving 
housing affordability problems.6 
2.2.5 Ratio 
As an indicator for expressing the relationship between housing costs and incomes, 
the ratio measure has the longest history and widest recognition for assessing 
affordability. Normatively, this approach recognises that what many households pay 
for housing in relation to their income is the result of difficult choices among limited 
and often unsatisfactory alternatives. It asserts that if a household pays more for 
housing than a certain percentage or fraction of its income, then it will not have 
enough left for other necessities. It usually specifies an explicit ratio of housing cost to 
income as a standard against which households’ actual circumstances can be 
measured. Yet, despite its widespread recognition and acceptance, there is no 
theoretical or logical foundation for the concept and the particular ratio or ratios that 
are used. 
How can one account for the existence and persistence of the fixed ratio or 
percentage of income affordability concept? Apart from its mathematical simplicity, the 
rationale for the conventional standard, and the rationalisation for raising the 
acceptable level in the US from 25 per cent to 30 per cent in the 1980s, and in 
Australia and other countries since then, has been built upon interpretations of 
empirical studies of what households actually spend for housing. Because ratios are 
pure numbers, they can be compared across time and space and thus are susceptible 
to being reified as universal and lawful. Such ‘laws’ then become legitimated as 
appropriate indicators and the basis for normative standards. 
Even most of those who have rejected the notion of a single ratio standard have 
accepted uncritically the ratio indicator. Feins and Lane, for example (1981, p.7), after 
discussing the distinction between indicators and standards, have asserted: ‘When we 
apply these terms to the issues of housing affordability, we find that the ratio of shelter 
expenditures to household income is the appropriate indicator’ (see also Pedone 1988, 
p.9; Yip 1995, Chapter 7; for a critique of such alleged ‘lawfulness’, see Chaplin et al. 
1994, pp.13–14). 
However, once the ratio measure is accepted as the appropriate indicator, ipso facto, 
the standard must be a ratio or a set of ratios. Yet the notion that a household can 
adequately meet its non-shelter needs if it has at least a certain percentage of income 
left after paying for housing implies either that the lower the income of a household, 
the lower the amount of money it requires for non-shelter needs, with no minimum 
whatsoever, or that the normative ratio must diminish with income, all the way to zero 
below certain incomes. Furthermore, since a housing affordability standard is intended 
to measure whether housing costs make an undue claim on household income in 
                                                                                                                                          
respect to age, amenities, space and condition, it is unlikely that most households would ever be able to 
obtain housing at the price hedonically determined for a unit that is minimally adequate physically, 
despite their best efforts. 
Thus, as suggested in the earlier section on housing standards, in assessing housing need on an 
individual basis, a household’s actual affordability situation could, in principle, be tempered by 
considering whether units meeting a minimal physical standard actually are available, as well as the 
monetary and non-monetary costs of moving, in order to determine whether or not their affordability 
problem is ‘by choice’. Obviously, this is very different from assessing the relationship between what a 
household actually pays for consumption of food and other non-housing items in relation to normative 
payment standards for these items. There are very good reasons for singling out housing for special 
status.  
6 For a similar argument, see Thalmann (2003, p.300). 
 20
 relation to other needs, basing such a standard on what people actually pay provides 
no way of assessing whether they are in fact able to achieve some minimum standard 
for non-shelter necessities. These logical flaws in the ratio approach led inexorably to 
the residual income concept of affordability. 
2.2.6 Residual income 
The residual income approach recognises that because of housing’s distinctive 
physical attributes in comparison with other necessities, its cost makes the largest and 
least flexible claim on after-tax income for most households, i.e. that non-housing 
expenditures are limited by how much income is left after paying for housing. This 
means that a household has a housing affordability problem if it cannot meet its non-
housing needs at some minimum level of adequacy after paying for housing. The 
appropriate indicator of the tension between housing costs and incomes is thus the 
difference between them—the residual income after paying for housing—rather than 
the ratio. That is, as Hulchanski (1995) has argued, the ratio is not a valid indicator of 
housing need and the ability to pay for housing, although it still could be useful as one 
indicator of actual housing expenditures in relation to incomes. 
What are the implications of this logic for the amount and fraction of income that 
households realistically can afford, i.e. for an affordability standard? Consider, for 
example, two households with comparable disposable incomes. Suppose that one 
consists of a single person, while the other is a couple with three children. Obviously 
the larger household would have to spend substantially more for its non-shelter 
necessities than would the small household in order to achieve a comparable material 
quality of life. This implies that the larger household can afford to spend less for 
housing than can the small household of the same income. Now compare two 
households of the same size and composition, but different after-tax incomes. Both 
would need to spend about the same amount to achieve a comparable standard of 
living for non-shelter items. The higher income household could thus afford to spend 
more for housing, in percentage of income as well as in monetary terms. 
Generalising from these examples: Since the non-housing expenses of small 
households are, on average, less than those of large households, to achieve a 
comparable basic standard of living, smaller households can reasonably devote a 
higher percentage of income to housing than can larger households with the same 
income. Since low income and higher income households of the same size and type 
require about the same amount of money to meet their non-housing needs at a 
comparable basic standard of living, those with lower incomes can afford to devote a 
smaller percentage of income for housing than otherwise similar higher income 
households can afford. In this way, the residual income standard emerges as a sliding 
scale of housing affordability—with the maximum affordable monetary amount and 
fraction of income varying with household size, type and income. Indeed, it implies 
that some households can afford nothing for housing, while others can afford more 
than any established ratio. 
Operationalising a residual income standard involves use of a socially-defined 
standard of adequacy for non-housing items. Thus, while the residual income logic 
has broad validity, a particular residual income standard is not universal, but socially 
grounded in space and time. Issues involved in selecting such a standard for non-
housing necessities will be taken up below as part of the review of the debates about 
affordability standards in the US, UK and Australia. This literature not only strengthens 
the argument for the residual income approach, it also helps to illuminate some of the 
practical tasks in operationalising such a standard. 
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 3 DEBATES ABOUT AFFORDABILITY STANDARDS 
Prior to the late 1960s in the US, the late 1980s in the UK and the late 1990s in 
Australia, leading housing experts accepted without question the ratio of housing 
costs to incomes as the appropriate affordability indicator, challenging only the notion 
of a single ratio as an appropriate normative standard (e.g. Rapkin 1957; Donnison 
1967, pp.65–8, pp.255–6). In Australia, the ‘after-housing poverty’ notion was first 
articulated in the mid-1970s (Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 1975), although its 
implications as a critique of and alternative to the ratio approach were little recognised 
and appreciated for the next two decades. 
In the US, initial interest was followed by nearly a decade of considerable intellectual 
ferment and great progress in reconceptualising affordability in terms of residual 
incomes, after which interest diminished until quite recently. In the UK, since about 
1990, there has been even richer debate, adding important theoretical foundation to 
the argument for the superiority of the residual income approach, but apparently with 
no recognition of work done in the US. By the same token, the UK literature seems 
not to have become familiar to most US readers. In Australia, discussion began in the 
late 1990s, drawing on some of the literature from both the US and the UK, with many 
academics becoming quite conversant with the issues and debates, but with 
penetration of the residual income approach into the policy arenas being quite recent 
and heretofore modest. Over the past decade, researchers in other parts of the world 
have begun incorporating the residual income approach into research and policy 
analyses. It is therefore worth reviewing the literature in the interest of promoting 
deeper understanding and further development of the residual income paradigm and 
its practical application. 
3.1 US debates about affordability standards 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, concern with poverty and urban problems in the US 
included considerable discussion of housing affordability concepts. A number of 
housing analysts looked at housing affordability in relation to income adequacy and 
living standards, not merely as a matter of housing costs; and they began questioning 
the conventional ratio approach to affordability. 
The late Cushing Dolbeare (1966, p.12) appears to have been one of the first to go 
beyond recognition of the inadequacy of the ratio standard, especially for the poor, 
and suggest an alternative. In a limited circulation pamphlet, she offered an alternative 
as part of a proposal for ‘housing grants for the very poor’: 
The subsidy might cover the difference between the amount the family could 
afford for shelter after meeting other basic needs and the cost of shelter—the 
‘residual’ approach. 
The compelling argument in favor of the residual approach is that it covers, if 
necessary, the full amount needed for housing, thus assuring that the recipient 
is able to meet as many … other basic needs—food, clothing, medical care, 
etc.—as possible. 
The proposed non-shelter standard in this residual income approach was an amount 
equal to the federal Poverty Threshold for a household of a given size, minus an 
estimated typical shelter cost for low-income households of that size (p.33). 
The issue emerged in the US policy arena under the auspices of the President’s 
Committee on Urban Housing, one of the commissions established in the wake of the 
urban riots of the mid-1960s. In its 1968 report the committee asked, ‘When does a 
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 family need a subsidy?’ and went on to declare (pp.41–2): ‘Determination of a proper 
proportion of a family’s income for housing requires some difficult value judgments … 
The staff concluded that no flat percentage can be equitable for all.’ Several of its 
consultants went a little further in conceptualising how a variable standard might be 
developed, but most then retreated to the simpler, conventional ratio standard (G.E. 
TEMPO 1968, p.15; Robert Gladstone and Associates 1968, pp.56–7). Another 
consultant did examine the differential effect of household size on housing affordability 
and, in doing so, used the concept of a ‘minimum adequate’ budget that varies with 
household size. Not surprisingly, he found that smaller households with incomes at 
the minimum budget level could obtain and afford shelter at higher rent/income ratios 
than could larger households (von Furstenberg 1968, p.107). 
Over the next few years, some elements of a consensus seemed to be emerging 
about an appropriate approach, until the issue was submerged by the economic crises 
of the 1970s. In 1971, a committee of the US congress published reports on housing 
affordability standards that it had requested from a number of experts. Three of the 
papers argued explicitly and strongly for using a residual income approach in analysis 
of housing needs and subsidy formulas for federal housing programs (Frieden 1971; 
Newman 1971; Lowry 1971). Both Newman and Lowry suggested that Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) normative family budgets should be used to set the standard for 
non-housing expenses. 
In the mid-1970s, a big step forward was taken when two research projects 
independently operationalised the residual income approach using the non-housing 
components of the BLS lower budgets and applied this standard to estimate the 
extent of housing affordability problems (Grigsby & Rosenburg 1975, p.78, for 
Baltimore; Stone 1975, p.23, for the US).7 Grigsby and Rosenburg first summarised 
the truism about housing costs (p.47): ‘with minor exceptions housing costs cannot be 
deferred or reduced by low income families, whereas other expenditures can be and 
are. As a result, households suffer from inadequate diet, clothing, and medical care, 
just to keep a roof over their heads.’ They then proceeded to advance the logic of 
residual incomes and the use of budget standards to operationalise a residual income 
standard (p.47): 
If it is accepted that the problem is one of housing cost as well as income, a 
measurable objective with respect to what is an excessive expenditure relative 
to income must be established … One possible measurable objective, then, 
could be derived by matching family income against the total cost of an 
acceptable living standard, for example, in one of the family budgets of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The family’s housing expenditures should not be so 
great as to leave it with insufficient money to acquire the non-housing 
necessities in any budget that is deemed appropriate. 
Applying the operational standard to Baltimore, they found that in 1969 nearly one-
third of all households were ‘bearing housing costs which may be considered 
excessive relative to income’ (p.78). 
In his paper, Stone introduced the term ‘shelter poverty’ to characterise households 
for whom the squeeze between income and housing cost leaves them unable to meet 
their non-shelter needs at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) lower budget standard. 
He asserted (p.146): 
Quite apart from variations in individual situations, it is apparent that in general 
the lower the income of a family the smaller the proportion of income they can 
                                                
7 In both cases, the residual income discussion was a small part of a much larger analysis.  
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 afford for housing. While the limitation of the conventional standard has been 
recognised, even officially, until now there has been no attempt to determine 
how much working-class families realistically can afford for housing and 
establish a standard which varies with income. 
He then provided an overview of his methodology (p.146): 
The standard budgets computed periodically by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) provide a basis for determining how much households of a given income 
and household size can, on average, afford for housing. The ‘lower budget’ in 
this series defines the level of expenditures necessary for a minimum 
adequate standard of living. The maximum amount a family can afford for 
shelter and still meet its other needs can thus be determined by subtracting 
from income the sum of all non-shelter consumption expenditures in the BLS 
lower budget plus personal taxes corresponding to that level of income 
[emphasis in original]. 
After illustrating the operationalisation of this methodology, Stone presented a 
summary of the application to 1970 US census data, concluding that 26 per cent of all 
households, including 34 per cent of renters and 21 per cent of homeowners, were 
shelter poor in that year (pp.147–8). 
Over the next two and a half decades, Stone continued to advance the arguments for 
the residual income approach and to update and apply the shelter poverty standard to 
housing problems and in the US as a whole (1983, 1990, 1993, 1994), as well as in 
Massachusetts (1989; Stone et al. 2000). While the 1983 and 1990 papers presented 
successively greater explication of the logic, methodology, results and potential policy 
implications and applications, his 1993 book provided by far the most comprehensive 
presentation of all four of these dimensions of the residual income approach (see e.g. 
Chapter 2 and appendices). 
Stone found that persistently about a third of US households have been shelter poor, 
with the incidence rising several percentage points above this level in recessions and 
falling several points below it in the best of times. By contrast, on the ratio standard, 
the incidence has risen monotonically since the 1970s: in the early 1970s, on the 25 
per cent of income standard, the incidence was about a third of households; by the 
1990s, it was about a third of households on the 30 per cent of income standard, and 
much more on the 25 per cent standard. Although there has been very considerable 
overlap between the households with affordability problems on the shelter poverty and 
ratio standards, Stone has found that the residual income approach reveals a lower 
incidence among small households and a higher incidence among large households, 
raising questions about the distribution of need and the allocation of housing subsidies. 
In their extensive monograph on housing affordability, Feins and Lane (1981) fully 
acknowledged the inadequacy of the single ratio standard, and proposed new 
standards ‘that are sensitive to income levels of renter households as well as to 
household size, age, and geographic location’ (p.58). They also proposed using the 
BLS budgets as the basis for their new standards, but argued that: 
… expectations about what lower-income and intermediate-income 
households are able to spend for shelter could be based on the proportion of 
the BLS budgets that are allocated for housing, and that this proportion could 
vary for households of different types and in different locales, as it does in the 
BLS budgets (p.59) [emphasis added]. 
That is, despite pushing the boundaries, they were ultimately unable to transcend the 
ratio paradigm, showing no awareness of the previous work that had been done on 
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 the residual income approach, other than passing reference to work by Stone, which 
they dismissed because they misread and misstated his central premise. They 
erroneously presumed that because he devised a normative standard for non-shelter 
items, he was arguing ‘that the budget’s designated costs for items other than shelter 
should be covered first, with only the residual income being allocated to rent’ (p.67). 
Stone was actually arguing that housing costs make the first claim on income, with 
residual income after-housing costs being insufficient to meet non-shelter needs if it is 
less than the BLS budget for non-shelter items. 
During the 1980s and 1990s several others broached the residual income argument, 
but with little impact on prevailing thought, let alone policy. For example, a 1980 report 
growing out of the Experimental Housing Allowance Demand Study proposed a 
residual income affordability standard, but suggested that the non-shelter standard be 
set at three-quarters of the federal poverty standard—a level considerably lower than 
the BLS lower budget non-shelter level. After making the proposal, however, the 
author proceeded to use the traditional 25 per cent of income standard in his analysis 
(Budding 1980). 
In the late 1980s, there was again a brief discussion in the US about the inadequacies 
of the ratio approach that brought the issue closer to the policy arena, although again 
only temporarily (National Housing Task Force 1988; Leonard et al. 1989). The 
Housing Task Force criticised the use of the fixed ratio payment standard for housing 
subsidies, arguing for a ‘flexible’ definition that was at least implicitly a residual income 
approach and paraphrasing the language in Stone’s 1983 paper as follows: 
Applying a single rent-to-income standard across the board to poverty-level 
households can produce serious inequities. A single person living alone, with 
an income toward the upper end of the eligible range, clearly can afford to pay 
a higher proportion of income for rent than a large family with children and 
income at the lower end of the scale. Current law recognises this by providing 
adjustments for minor children, but more should be done. 
Accordingly, the Task Force recommends that Congress consider requiring a 
sliding scale of tenant payments based upon family size and income. Larger 
families with lower incomes would pay a smaller proportion of income; small, 
relatively better-off households would pay a large proportion (p.44). 
Leonard et al. restated the arguments against the ratio approach and in favour of the 
residual income logic (pp.69–72). They operationalised a residual income standard 
based on the BLS lower budget non-housing components, following the same logic 
developed earlier by Stone and by Grigsby and Rosenburg. 
Combs et al. (1995) compared three measures of housing affordability: a ratio 
standard based on spending over 30 per cent of income for housing; a residual 
income standard they call ‘housing poverty’ based on an after-housing non-shelter 
standard set at 70 per cent of the poverty level; and what they call ‘housing burden’, 
which combines aspects of the other two. The latter defines a household as housing 
burdened if it both spends over 30 per cent of income for housing and has an after-
housing residual income of less than 70 per cent of the poverty level. This measure 
thus does not consider a household to be housing burdened if it is spending less than 
30 per cent for housing but has a residual income equal to less than 70 per cent of the 
poverty level. Not surprisingly, they found that the incidence of affordability problems 
became successively lower in going from the first to the second to the third of their 
measures. While their housing burden concept may help to focus attention on the 
income side of the issue, it is not apparent that it does so more effectively than a pure 
residual income approach, and it lacks a sound theoretical and conceptual basis. 
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 Bogdon and Can (1997), in a paper on the measurement of local housing affordability 
problems, compared various approaches, including the ratio measure and the shelter 
poverty residual income approach, as well as several others that are actually 
adaptations of the ratio measure. Ultimately, though, they adopted the ratio measure 
and its variations for convenience. 
The last ten years have witnessed a substantial increase in the quantity and depth of 
discussion and awareness of the residual income approach in the US. First of all, the 
widely read State of the Nation’s Housing, prepared and published annually by the 
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, first took note and used the 
term ‘residual income’ in their 2003 report (p.26 & Figure 25). Their approach has 
been descriptive and empirical; reporting how much residual income households in 
each quintile of income would have available to cover non-housing expenses if they 
were paying either 30 per cent or 50 per cent of income for housing. Each subsequent 
year’s report has continued to provide a few illustrations of residual incomes in this 
way. To be sure, the ratio standard has continued to be the point of reference, and 
there is no discussion of a normative standard against which to measure residual 
incomes. Nonetheless, the notion of ‘residual income’ as relevant for assessing 
affordability has reached a far wider audience than previously. 
In an important paper, Kutty (2005) forcefully restated the case for the residual income 
approach, alluding especially to the work of Stone. Most notably, she has 
operationalised a residual income standard with the non-housing standard set at two-
thirds of the federal poverty threshold and applied it to compute what she calls 
‘housing induced poverty’. As she acknowledges, her choice of a non-shelter standard 
is lower than the BLS lower budget standard used by Stone and others. 
A Joint Center report (Belsky et al. 2005) on measuring rental affordability mentioned 
the residual income approach, citing both Stone and Kutty. However, the analytical 
work in the paper used the ratio approach, while also noting problems with uncritical 
reliance on the approach. 
In addition, during this period, Stone published his greatest concentration of papers on 
the residual income approach (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d). While the first 
four of these largely present application of his shelter poverty approach to assess 
housing needs and problems, the last of these papers (2006d) and a paper by 
Pelletiere (2008) are the most comprehensive recent syntheses in the US literature on 
the theoretical and conceptual issues involved in defining and measuring housing 
affordability. Stone’s paper brings together the early conceptual work done in the US 
with the more recent theoretical work done in the UK (discussed in the next section) to 
provide the most compelling argument for the residual income approach. He also 
addresses the practical issues in operationalising the approach. 
Pelletiere devotes more attention to the budget standards literature and to reforming 
rent policy in light of the critiques of the rigid ratio approach and insights of the 
residual income approach. Nonetheless, with respect to policy reform, he concludes in 
some dismay (p.19): 
Today, most administering agencies continue to see rent reform as rent 
simplification, and a means to encourage greater employment and self-
sufficiency among program participants. Both serve the goal of reducing 
program costs … 
With the discussion of rent and subsidy determination stuck defending the 
status quo, and with little current empirical data to test the impact of 
alternatives on current and future recipients and program finances, no policy 
space exists to consider alternatives. 
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 This has left the residual income approach sidelined in policy discussions, 
largely because it has little to offer in the context of the current debate. Any 
system that determines rents and subsidies based on residual income, 
whether it is determined on an individual budget basis or by assigning 
households to specific categories, is not likely to be less complicated than the 
current system of income adjustments, though it is perhaps no more 
complicated. Also … on its own, the residual income approach does not 
provide an intuitive response to those motivated by incentives for work on the 
one hand and disincentives for fraud on the other. 
Finally, while the current policy deadlock does not preclude the use of more 
precise residual income and more normative quantity based budgeting results 
as standards of affordability, the lack of a policy mandating the use of such 
standards is a barrier to the creation of a special purpose data set and a 
consensus quantity based budget and in general a barrier to their broad 
acceptance. 
In sum, the US has the longest and most developed set of work on the residual 
income approach, but this approach has not entered substantially into the policy 
environment. 
3.2 UK debates about affordability standards 
In the late 1980s, concern about rising housing costs across all sectors of housing in 
the UK—social rented, private rented and owner-occupied—opened up discussion 
and debate about the meaning of housing affordability (see Malpass & Murie 1999, 
p.162, for a summary of the context). Since then, there has developed extensive 
exploration of the issue by members of the academic, professional and advocacy 
communities, but apparently reluctance by the government to adopt an appropriate 
workable definition for use in assessing housing need and making policy. 
The literature on housing affordability concepts that emerged in the UK since about 
1990 seems to fall into three categories (although some studies combine more than 
one of these). These are, first, conceptual and theoretical explorations, second, 
examinations of the implications of various affordability standards for Housing Benefit 
formulas and rent setting in social housing, and third, a tiny number of studies of the 
extent and distribution of housing affordability problems based on one or more of the 
standards. Until very recently, this literature has shown essentially no awareness of 
the US discussions summarised above, and those papers that have looked at the US 
just refer to the ratio standard enshrined in official policy. Similarly, in the US, there 
has been lack of awareness of the rich discussion about affordability that has taken 
place over the past two decades in the UK. 
Maclennan and Williams are often quoted as having offered one of the earliest UK 
statements on the meaning of housing affordability (1990, p.9): 
‘Affordability’ is concerned with securing some given standard of housing (or 
different standards) at a price or rent which does not impose, in the eyes of 
some third party (usually government) an unreasonable burden on household 
incomes. A number of judgements and assumptions are usually made in 
putting the concept into practice, and, in broad terms, affordability is assessed 
by the ratio of a chosen definition of housing costs to a selected measure of 
household income in some given time period. 
The first sentence is certainly beyond dispute as a general statement of what is meant 
by ‘affordability’. The second is a fairly accurate statement of conventional policy and 
practice, certainly in the US, if not the UK. Note, though, that they stated that 
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 ‘affordability is assessed by the ratio’ [emphasis added], not ‘affordability is usually 
assessed’ or ‘affordability is conventionally assessed’. Throughout their paper, and at 
that time, there was not yet in the UK an explicit challenge to the ratio approach to 
defining and measuring affordability. It is ironic that the paper was presented at a 
conference on ‘Affordable Housing in the US and UK’, but it illustrates the point made 
in the preceding paragraph: even a full reading of their paper reveals that references 
to affordability measures in the US have been limited to the ratio standard. 
Nonetheless, Maclennan and Williams expressed some dismay at the failure of 
government in the UK to advance a definition, and they argued for work to be done 
towards such a definition (pp.8–9): 
However, as the term has been given no explicit meaning by government in 
Britain the notion of ‘affordability’ in Britain is less than clear. 
Though ill-defined and perhaps meaningless in the current British policy 
debate, affordability does, nevertheless, carry significant meaning and not just 
at a purely semantic level. Implicit in the term, even in its current usage, are a 
wide range of assumptions whose implications are central to housing policy 
debate in both countries. It is only by probing these assumptions and 
examining existing usages that a new meaning can be constructed. 
Five years later, again within the context of a conference on housing policy in the UK 
and North America, Maclennan summarised the state of affairs in the UK (1995, 
p.684): ‘There has been a long and imprecise debate in the UK, and, unlike the 
governments in Canada and the United States, the UK government has been 
unwilling to specify appropriate ratios (or better, residual incomes—that is, net 
equivalent income minus housing costs)’ [emphasis added]. While he was apparently 
still critical of the government’s failure to specify an affordability standard, his 
reference to and preference for the residual income approach suggests that a debate 
had been underway, and that in the five years since his earlier paper with Williams 
this debate had not been as ‘imprecise’ as he lamented. What had happened in the 
intervening five years to put the residual income approach onto the agenda and, at 
least for one UK expert, in the preferred place? 
1990 seems to have marked a watershed in the UK for conceptualising housing 
affordability. On the one hand, a study of housing association rent setting by Ferguson 
and Wilcox (1990) only considered the percentage of income (ratio) approach, largely 
based on the empirical/normative confusion discussed earlier (pp.14–16), but did 
recognise that there are problems with using a single percentage for all household 
types (pp.27–8). Similarly, the National Federation of Housing Associations (1990) 
uncritically accepted the ratio concept and used empirical averages to set a normative 
standard. Bramley, in an unpublished paper (1990), offered a broad definition of 
affordability that appeared to move in the direction of a residual income approach, but 
then apparently actually used a ratio standard in his research (as noted in Hancock, 
1993, p.129, p.133). 
On the other hand, two reports by Brownill et al., growing out of a Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation project on housing affordability in London, provided deeper criticism of the 
ratio approach. More significantly, they made an argument for the logic of the residual 
income approach, in terms quite similar to the logic underlying the shelter poverty 
concept in the US (Brownill et al. 1990; Sharp et al. 1990, Chapter 2). Specifically, 
they presented survey data on residual incomes after housing costs of council tenants 
receiving and not receiving Housing Benefit (Brownill et al. 1990, p.30), and they 
argued (pp.47–9) that: 
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 The relation between housing costs and income is the crux of the affordability 
debate. This … has been characterised by a search for a definitive ratio of 
costs to income as a measure of affordability. For example, rent levels of 20 
per cent of net income have been widely canvassed as ‘affordable’. Our 
analysis calls into question such simple assessments on two counts. 
First, there are many other housing costs which should be taken into 
consideration. Secondly, no single ratio could apply over time to people on 
varied incomes, in different types of household and tenure. After all, 20 per 
cent of a low income leaves a lot less to spend on other essential items than 
20 per cent of a high income. A more useful approach is to consider what 
income is necessary to meet basic needs for different types of households. It 
is the amount of money left after housing costs have been met that is crucial in 
determining whether the costs of housing are really affordable. 
Their work was thus a significant step forward, but the authors did not then suggest a 
normative standard for a minimally adequate residual income or a direction for 
establishing such a standard. 
Subsequent to the work of Bramley and Brownill there were a growing number of UK 
studies largely driven by social housing rent setting considerations rather than broader 
housing affordability issues that recognised the potential importance of a residual 
model for policy purposes, but did not undertake any substantive empirical research 
(Hancock 1993; Kearns 1992; Gibbs 1992; Randolph 1992, 1993). However. Hancock 
and Randolph both proposed operationalising a residual income method for rent 
setting whereby a normative standard of some percentage above Housing Benefit 
level (120% Randolph, 140% Hancock) for relevant household types should be set as 
the affordable rent. In 1993, the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations adopted 
a policy that combined a ratio with a residual income standard (SFHA 1993, quoted in 
SFHA 1999, p.4): 
A rent is affordable only if: 
Æ No working household is obliged to pay more than 25 per cent of net 
income (including Housing Benefit) on rent. 
Æ No working household is left with less than 140 per cent of the appropriate 
Income Support amount. 
This formula implies that any working household with net income of less than or equal 
to 140 per cent of the Income Support level would pay zero rent. Households with 
incomes above 140 per cent of Income Support presumably would have pound for 
pound applied to rent, i.e. a taper of 100 per cent, up to the income at which rent was 
equal to 25 per cent of net income; this works out to be 187 per cent of Income 
Support (140/[1-0.25]). Households with incomes above this level would face a taper 
of 25 per cent, i.e. for every £4 of income above this level, rent would be £1 higher, 
with the other £3 available for other purposes at the households’ discretion. While this 
mixed formula had no theoretical justification, it was sophisticated and extremely 
generous. It recognised the fundamental logic of residual income and the 
appropriateness, at least for working families, of a normative standard for non-shelter 
items higher than the Income Support standard. The 100 per cent taper over a portion 
of the range might arguably be a disincentive for households to increase their incomes, 
but the limited range of this severe taper and the very generous taper above it might 
have more than offset such a disincentive.8 
                                                
8 It is not known whether this formula was ever implemented and, if so, whether its impact was evaluated. 
Following a later re-examination (SFHA, 1999), the federation abandoned advocacy of this formula in 
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 There were papers in this period that grounded analysis in the wider affordability 
problems in the UK. Bramley, for example, focused in detail on the scope and causes 
of ‘An Affordability Crisis in British Housing’, but began with an overview of 
affordability definitions. He expressed intellectual support for the residual income 
approach, but concern about its relationship to the definition of poverty (1994, p.104): 
It seems to both the author and others that the most coherent normative 
concept of affordability is one that links normative judgements about housing 
needs/standards with judgements about minimum income requirements for 
non-housing consumption. This implies that housing affordability is closely 
bound up with the definition of a poverty line, and that the key ratios are likely 
to be expressed in terms of residual income (after housing costs) relative to 
that line. In general, there is less consensus about poverty line definition than 
about basic housing standards, and normative need-type statements lose 
much of their force if they do not reflect consensus. 
His caveat may be justified, but is diminished by ambiguity about the type of poverty 
line definition that is relevant for a residual income approach to affordability. One 
could argue that one of the principal reasons why there is less consensus about a 
poverty line definition is because such definitions usually include housing costs as an 
essential component, even though it is not possible to arrive at an appropriate 
minimum housing cost to include, as discussed above with regard to the budget 
standards methodology. If there were to be a clearer focus on defining a ‘poverty’ 
standard for non-shelter items, it would not be surprising if there were greater 
consensus than about poverty as conventionally conceived. 
While he summarised such problems, unfortunately he did not then attempt to specify 
‘critical thresholds’ or to fine-tune either the ratio or residual income standards on the 
basis of the data. 
Chaplin et al. (1994) examined affordability definitions and measures, with particular 
attention to the ratio and residual income approaches. Although they present critiques 
of each approach, they affirmed that the ratio approach cannot stand up to careful 
scrutiny. Thus, throughout the paper they repeatedly acknowledge the basic logic of 
the residual income approach, for example (p.6): ‘This would hardly be a useful basis 
for a normative standard under either a residual income or ratio definition.’9 However, 
they then move on to develop a statistically complex measure of affordability that 
would still leave unresolved what represented a normative standard to judge 
affordability even adapted to a residual method. 
The most comprehensive UK examination of housing affordability has been Yip’s 
1995 DPhil thesis from the University of York, Housing Affordability in England, which 
apparently and unfortunately has not resulted in any published work. This study well 
explained the ratio, residual income and behavioural approaches to affordability, 
carried out extensive analyses of housing expenditure patterns, and computed the 
incidence of affordability problems on various standards using data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey. His approach to residual income used two alternative standards: 
the first was 140 per cent of Income Support level as the normative standard for non-
shelter items, the same standard that Karen Hancock had used as the most generous 
definition in her Glasgow study; the second was 50 per cent of national average 
                                                                                                                                          
favour of a vaguer approach that resolves the tension between true affordability and the need for 
adequate rental income in favour of the latter.  
9  Note also that while the narrative explanation of their method is clear, there are errors in the 
mathematical formulas. 
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 income before housing cost (p.138). 10  His latter approach represents the only 
example heretofore of a residual income standard independent of the benefits 
systems. 
Yip’s thesis was an empirical tour de force, making use of sophisticated statistical 
methods to extract as much insight as one could imagine from Family Expenditure 
Survey data. He did not, however, make any conceptual advances. Furthermore, 
while his use of 50 per cent of national average income was a creative alternative for 
specifying the non-shelter standard in the residual income approach, he did not 
consider drawing upon the budget standards work of Jonathan Bradshaw and the 
Family Budget Unit even though he did mention this in passing. Also, he expressed a 
preference for the ratio over the residual income approach, basing his position on two 
arguments that have been shown above to be weak at best: that the ratio approach is 
supported by empirical ‘laws’ and that the residual income approach is too closely 
bound up with the concept of poverty (Yip 1995, p.134). 
Since 1995, the UK literature on affordability concepts has, for the most part, shown 
familiarity with the debates and cited some of the preceding sources, but been 
focused on policy issues, particularly rent setting in social housing and Housing 
Benefit reform (Freeman et al. 1999; Wilcox 1999). The papers by academics and 
policy research centres have all acknowledged the conceptual weaknesses of the 
ratio approach and recognised the logical superiority of residual income, but none has 
been able to untie the Gordian knot binding the operationalisation of residual income 
to the existing standards embedded within Income Support and Housing Benefit 
policies. Thus, no further conceptual work has been done. Nor, until several years ago, 
had the knot been cut in such a way that it allowed for the development of a more 
sophisticated operational model of the residual income approach. 
A methodological breakthrough finally came when Stone (2006e) proposed and 
operationalised a residual income standard for the UK not tied to the poverty standard, 
or the Income Support or Housing Benefit systems. His model was based on 
indicative budgets, following upon the approach that he, as well as Grigsby and 
Rosenberg, had first developed in the US in the mid-1970s. 
Stone has explained the methodological approach as follows (p.459): 
Operationalising the shelter poverty scale involves use of a conservative, 
socially defined minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter necessities, 
scaled for differences in household size and type. It takes into account the 
actual cost of a standardised, basic ‘market basket’ of non-shelter necessities 
in determining the maximum amount of money households can afford to spend 
for housing and still have enough left to pay for this basic market basket of 
non-shelter necessities. Thus, while the logic of shelter poverty has broad 
validity, a particular shelter poverty scale is not universal; it is socially 
grounded in space and time. 
The practical challenge in translating the shelter poverty concept into an 
operational affordability scale is how to specify the monetary level of a 
minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter items. 
From a review of the UK history and experience with quantity-based normative 
budgets, Stone concluded (p.460) that: 
                                                
10 Applying the two standards to Family Expenditure Survey data, Yip found that 29 per cent had an 
affordability problem based on the former standard, 28 per cent on the latter, with essentially the same 
group of households (97 per cent classified the same on the two standards (p.145)).  
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 … the budget standards approach, especially that of Bradshaw and his 
colleagues in the Family Budget Unit (FBU), is directly relevant (Bradshaw et 
al. 1987; Bradshaw 1993; Bradshaw & Sainsbury 2000). 
The ‘low cost’ budget, originally computed by Yu (1993), and since refined and 
updated as the ‘low cost but acceptable’ (LCA) budget by Parker and her 
colleagues at the FBU (Family Budget Unit 2002a, 2002b, 2004a, 2004b; 
Parker 1998; Parker et al. 2001a, 2001b, 2002), provides the ingredients for 
an appropriate residual income (i.e. nonshelter) standard needed to 
operationalise the shelter poverty affordability model for the UK. 
The methodology is presented in detail and then applied to generate an operational 
residual income standard for several types of households (p.467): 
A shelter poverty scale has been computed for a set of prototypical household 
types: non-elderly two-adult households with zero to three children; non-elderly 
one-adult households with zero to three children; and elderly singles and 
couples. All of the non-elderly households are assumed to have employed 
adults so that the non-shelter standard includes job-related costs, most 
especially childcare, albeit at a conservative level. 
Stone concludes (p.467): ‘quite clearly there is no single percentage of income, nor 
even a small set of percentages, that can approximate what households of various 
types and incomes can realistically afford’. He does suggest some of the potential 
implications of the approach for assessing housing problems and needs, alluding to 
his detailed work on housing affordability in the US, but did not carry out any such 
analyses for the UK. 
There does not appear to have been any subsequent published work on the residual 
income approach and its application to housing in the UK. 
3.3 Australian debates about affordability standards 
The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975), known as the ‘Henderson 
Commission’ after its chairman, introduced to Australia the notion of ‘after-housing 
poverty’. In doing so, it recognised that housing costs tend to make the first claim on 
household incomes and also show enormous variation, in contrast with the basic cost 
of other necessities, associated with differences in tenure and location. While this 
might have provided a logical entree into Australia for the residual income approach to 
measuring housing affordability, more than two decades had to pass before the 
residual income approach began to receive serious and explicit attention. Since then, 
it has been quite extensively explored and debated, although it has not had any 
demonstrable impact on policy. 
There is major conceptual difficulty with using the Henderson after-housing poverty 
measure as a normative standard for non-shelter items in a residual income housing 
affordability standard: it was arrived at by using the ratio affordability concept. 
Specifically, the commission assumed that a family with an after-tax income at the 
before-housing poverty threshold needed 23 per cent of that income for housing 
(Bradbury et al. 1987, p.97). That is, the standard for non-housing necessities did not 
have an independent theoretical or empirical basis. This is the same weakness 
encountered in the work of several US researchers who used a fraction of the poverty 
level, discussed above. 
Furthermore, the Henderson Report was focused on income inadequacy, and 
regarded even after-housing poverty as essentially an income problem, not housing 
affordability. As Burke has put it (1998, p.179): 
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 The Henderson Report lacked any conceptual analysis of the housing system 
and housing markets and failed therefore to comprehend and build upon the 
fact that there are systemic problems in the Australian housing system. 
Nonetheless, in the following two decades, two projects in Australia explicitly looked at 
the impacts of housing in after-housing poverty. First was the work of Bradbury, 
Rossiter and Vipond (1986, 1987). Their 1986 paper was focused specifically on the 
elderly, arguing that after-housing poverty was a more realistic measure than before-
housing poverty for this population because of dramatic differences in housing costs 
by tenure. Their empirical work demonstrated that among owner-occupiers after-
housing poverty was thus much lower than before-housing, while among private 
sector renters just the opposite. 
In their 1987 paper, ‘Housing and Poverty in Australia’, these authors emphasised that 
the extraordinary character of housing gives it ‘a special place in the analysis of social 
inequality’ (p.95). Their empirical analysis of before-housing and after-housing poverty 
found that the incidence was very nearly the same on both measures, but ‘despite the 
similarity of these estimates, the populations in the two types of poverty are not the 
same’ (p.97). From analysis of the differences, they concluded (p.100): 
The data … show the significant role played by housing outlays in alleviating 
and in imposing poverty in Australia. The key distinction is housing tenure. 
Many low-income owner occupiers are saved from poverty by their low 
housing outlays. On the other hand, about an equal number of families who 
live in private rental accommodation or who are buying their own homes are 
forced into poverty by their high housing costs relative to their incomes. Public 
sector housing plays a minor role in alleviating poverty. 
In the mid-1990s, important work in advancing the residual income method was made 
by King (1996) in a paper which reaffirmed the problems of the ratio method and put 
the case for a residual method, but in the absence of a budget standard his case was 
still built around the poverty line. Burke (1998), building on data provided by King, 
used an after-housing poverty measure to get an overview of the scale of after-
housing poverty in Australia. Landt and Bray (1997) promoted a similar approach but 
focused on rental housing affordability, but like all the authors to this period were 
handicapped by the absence of a budget standard. 
Probably the most important work in this era was a second major housing research 
project using the Henderson after-housing measure. Carried out under the auspices of 
the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), this focused particularly on 
measurement and data issues for housing assistance policy (Karmel 1998a, 1998b, 
1998c). Most particularly, the study contrasted the fixed-ratio affordability standard put 
forward in the 1991 National Housing Strategy (NHS) with an AIHW-developed sliding 
scale of affordability The differences are several and significant (Karmel 1998a, pp.5–
7): 
First, the AIHW 1995 measure identifies low income families using family 
specific cut-offs related to income and housing needs as determined by their 
composition and location, while the NHS measure uses a relative income 
approach with families being classified as ‘low income’ depending upon their 
position in the income distribution. Secondly, the principle that housing costs of 
such families should not prevent such households from meeting basic non-
housing needs is incorporated in the AIHW measure but not that of NHS. 
Thirdly, in the AIHW approach the percentage of income a family on low 
income can reasonably be expected to spend on housing without experiencing 
housing need increases as income increases—the NHS measure uses a fixed 
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 proportion across all income levels. Finally, the AIHW measure allows for 
variation of basic housing costs and general living expenses between families, 
depending upon such factors as their size, composition and where they live, 
while the NHS measure does not capture these variations. 
This is, of course, essentially the argument for the residual income approach. Karmel 
explicitly mentions this (1998a, pp.10–11), but does distinguish it from the AIHW 
sliding scale. The latter establishes a housing affordability standard as a percentage 
of household net income that increases linearly from zero at income equal to the 
Henderson after-poverty threshold up to 30 per cent at some ‘low income benchmark’, 
which could be the Henderson before-housing poverty level. It is thus not a true 
residual income standard, and does still have some arbitrary aspects, albeit much less 
than the fixed ratio standard. On the other hand, it does avoid having to specify a 
monetary normative standard for non-housing costs. 
Furthermore, in operationalising the AIHW scale and applying it empirically, Karmel 
(1998b, 1998c) has refined the Henderson before-housing standard to take into 
account regional variation in housing costs, and both standards to take into account 
differences in household size and composition. Several other authors, in papers on 
housing affordability and income adequacy in Australia, have also made adjustments 
and refinements to the Henderson standards (Bourassa 1996; Chotikapanich et al. 
2003; Siminski & Saunders 2004; Kazakevitch & Borrowman 2009). None of these 
authors, though, pushed beyond the Henderson approach towards a residual income 
housing affordability standard based upon an alternative framework for a normative 
non-housing standard, i.e. budget standards. 
The basis for formulating such normative non-housing standards for Australia was 
provided with the Development of Indicative Budget Standards for Australia by the 
Budget Standards Unit (BSU) of the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) at the 
University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998). Drawing theoretically and 
methodologically upon the extensive history of such work in the UK and US, but 
pushing beyond it, they formulated normative budgets as the sum of cost standards 
(as of February 1997) for nine separate categories of consumption. Two budget 
standards were established: ‘modest but adequate’ and ‘low cost’. The ‘modest but 
adequate’ standard was similar to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
‘intermediate’ budget, which at early points had been called ‘modest but adequate’. 
The ‘low cost’ budget was similar to the BLS ‘lower’ budget and the UK Family Budget 
Unit (FBU) ‘low cost but acceptable’ budgets mentioned earlier that have been used to 
operationalise residual income affordability standards for the US and UK. 
One of the notable advances of the Australian indicative budgets over the work in the 
US and UK is that the modest but adequate standard was computed for 26 household 
types and the lower standard for 20 household types, differing by size, composition 
and tenure. This level of detail obviated the need for contentious equivalency scales 
that plagued the US and UK standards and the Henderson poverty standard in 
Australia. 
Consistent with comments earlier in this paper, the discussion of the housing budget 
in the SPRC report is insightful and relevant to the issue of the use of the budget 
standards for residual income affordability. It is noted that variation in tenure, housing 
quality, and location (Saunders et al. 1998, p.113): 
make it very difficult to establish a single housing standard for use in the BSU 
budgets. The dilemma underlying this difficulty reflects the nature of the 
Australian housing market, which is characterised by its variety when what is 
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 ideally required for budget standards purposes is a single representative 
figure—in relation to both quality and cost [emphasis in original]. 
The project made efforts to address these issues, but acknowledged that ‘the solution 
is not ideal’, and offered the following strong caveat (p.114): 
In light of these problems, a strong case can be made for treating the housing 
component of the budget standards separately from the remaining 
components. This should be kept firmly in mind when using the overall BSU 
budgets inclusive of housing [emphasis in original]. 
Thus, the residual income affordability work using the non-housing portion of the 
indicative budgets is quite consistent with the position articulated by the authors of the 
budget standards. 
With the dawn of the 21st century, a whole new era began in the definition and 
measurement of housing affordability in Australia, driven by substantive and policy 
concern about the issue, and facilitated by growing awareness of work done in the US 
and UK and the availability of the SPRC budget standards. Much of this work has 
been sponsored by AHURI. 
Seelig (1999) was the first to explore the potential use of budget standards, but his 
substantial paper was not generally available, being an in-house document of the 
Queensland Department of Housing. It used both the poverty line and budget 
standard and modelled it to Department of Family and Community Services social 
security payment rates for a number of household types and for application to 
Queensland and five regional rental housing markets. In the residual income analysis 
part of the report, whereby the study measured the residual rent affordability for 
certain household types, a rent for each type had to be created rather than using the 
SPRC rent which was based on outer suburban Sydney. This was based on the 
Queensland Department of Housing’s assessment of the notional rent for the relevant 
household, a rent which tended to be lower than median market rents. These rents 
were also adjusted for rent assistance. This method enabled a measure of the 
percentage of households on the specific benefits nominated who were experiencing 
a housing affordability problem. The SPRC and poverty line were both used to 
produce a residual income measure, with the SPRC method showing more 
households in a severe affordability situation. This was a very rich and potentially 
important study, but its significance was reduced somewhat by it being a government 
report with little visibility and with a focus on Queensland alone. 
Burke and Ralston (2003) produced the first paper that made explicit use of budget 
standards to assess affordability in Australia as a whole. Analysis of expenditure 
patterns and levels of indebtedness of public and private rental households, 1975 to 
1999, assessed and compared affordability based on the traditional ratio approach 
and on residual income approaches using both the Henderson after-housing model 
and a budget standards model. Before presenting their findings, they provided a brief 
discussion on ‘measuring housing affordability’ that compared these approaches. In 
doing so, though, they refer to the ratio standard as ‘shelter first’ and residual income 
models as ‘non-shelter first’. 
Their distinction is erroneous. In stating (p.7) that ‘an alternative approach to 
affordability is to assume that other expenditure items have first claim on the budget, 
and housing costs should be the residual’, they have confused the mathematical 
procedure for computing a residual income standard with the conceptual logic and 
behavioural reality. The ratio approach and the residual income approach both assert 
that because housing costs behaviourally tend to make the first claim on disposable 
income, a household has an affordability problem if, after paying for housing, it has 
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 insufficient residual income to meet its non-shelter needs at some normative level of 
adequacy. 
The difference between the two approaches is how they define the normative level of 
adequacy for non-shelter items. The ratio approach defines it as a fraction of income: 
traditionally 75 per cent, more recently 70 per cent, has been defined as the minimum 
share of income that must be available after housing costs in order to avoid hardship 
in meeting non-shelter needs. That is, it is presumed that irrespective of the level of 
income and household composition, non-shelter needs can be met adequately if this 
share of income is left after paying for housing. By contrast, the residual income 
approach defines the normative level of adequacy for non-shelter items as a monetary 
amount that is independent of income but very dependent upon household 
composition and the non-housing cost of living as a function of time and place. 
In order to determine the maximum amount that a household can afford for housing 
without compromising its non-shelter needs, the residual income model subtracts from 
disposable income the appropriate non-shelter monetary standard. This procedure 
does not determine ‘how much is available for rent’, as Burke and Ralston assert (p.7); 
rather it determines how much is affordable for rent. If the amount the household 
actually pays for rent, as the first claim on its disposable income, exceeds this 
affordable amount, then the residual income available for non-shelter needs is 
inadequate. This conceptual error has been addressed in the operationalising of the 
concept in a later part of this paper. 
The paper describes the SPRC indicative budget standards and explains how they 
have used the budget standards for their empirical work (pp.9–10). They have used 
the low cost budget standard, but consistent with the SPRC caveats about the 
housing component and consistent with the residual income logic, declared (p.10): ‘In 
the analysis used in this study, actual private and public rents from the 1998–99 HES 
were substituted for these surrogate values.’ 
At a later point, they explain this methodology in fuller detail, after presenting some of 
their extensive empirical findings, including disposable incomes after housing costs 
(i.e. residual incomes), without comparison to a normative standard. Their approach 
was not to establish a residual income affordability standard as a function of income 
and household type and assess actual housing costs of households in the HES 
against this standard, as Stone has done for the US. Rather, they derived revised 
budget standards for private and public renters of various household types by 
subtracting from the SPRC total budget for that type of household, the housing 
component of that SPRC budget and then adding the HES mean rent for households 
of that type who are below the budget standard, all adjusted to years other than 1997–
98 by changes in the CPI (pp.20–1). 
Having applied these revised budget standards to the disposable incomes of private 
and public renters in the HES, they estimated the number and percentage of private 
and public renter households with housing need on the 25 per cent and 30 per cent 
ratio standards, the after-housing poverty and the revised budget standard 
approaches. The findings led them to a very powerful conclusion (p.22): 
When we look at the budget standard, it is clear that percentage benchmarks 
do not allow for an adequate standard of living. Despite rent rebates and, in 
the case of many private tenants, rent assistance, the amount of housing 
subsidy is insufficient to prevent a sizable proportion falling below the 
minimum budget standard … It has become almost an orthodoxy of belief in 
Australia that, once provided public housing, a tenant, by virtue of the rebate, 
is able to live at a satisfactory, albeit basic, level. These findings challenge that 
 36
 belief. Achieving affordability, when this is based on a rent first market derived 
notion, is not a sufficient goal. Affordability should mean having sufficient to 
live after paying housing costs, rather than how we currently conceive of it, i.e. 
having costs below some rent to income benchmark. 
Thus, after some initial difficulties in explication, Burke and Ralston arrived at a sound 
understanding of the residual income approach, how it can be operationalised with 
budget standards, and its implications for measuring and understanding the extent of 
housing needs in Australia. Building on their work, McNelis (2006) used a very similar 
methodology to model the impact of a residual income rent on different types of public 
housing households. 
The purpose of the modelling exercise was to assess whether public housing 
households had sufficient income to meet a minimum standard of living. It was 
assumed that rents would be at least able to cover operating and asset utilisation 
costs. The general results of McNelis’ research indicated that most households 
require an income higher than their current Centrelink entitlements in order to meet a 
minimum standard of living. If rents were set as a proportion of income based on the 
budget standard, they would range from a low of 15 per cent for a ‘couple plus four 
children’ household (occupying a four-bedroom dwelling) to 33 per cent for a ‘single 
aged’ household. One objective of this study is to explore further and to widen the 
research opened up by McNelis. 
Somewhat later than both Burke and Ralston’s and McNelis’ papers, AHURI launched 
a National Research Venture 3 (NRV3)—‘Housing Affordability for Lower Income 
Australians’. The project has been one of the most comprehensive explorations of 
housing affordability, certainly in Australia and possibly in any country, yielding eleven 
research papers as well as a Final Report. Nonetheless, for the most part, the papers 
have accepted and used the ratio standard of affordability. Two have explored various 
affordability concepts, including the residual income approach (Gabriel et al. 2005; 
Yates & Gabriel 2006), and hence are most relevant for this review. Yet even they are 
reluctant to venture far from the prevailing paradigm, as revealed at the outset 
(Gabriel et al. 2005, p.v): 
The paper provides a rationale for continued use of the 30/40 affordability rule 
(that is housing costs below 30% for the bottom 40% of the [unequivalised] 
income distribution) both because it provides continuity with traditionally used 
measures and because it is simple to apply and easy to understand. However, 
a case is also made for providing additional complementary measures that are 
more responsive to household needs and capacity to pay. 
There is considerable irony in this statement in view of the acknowledgement that the 
ratio standard is not as responsive to household needs and capacity to pay as other 
measures. 
Building upon much of the affordability literature from the US, UK and Canada, the 
bulk of the paper by Gabriel et al. is devoted to the issues involved in measuring 
affordability, including the conceptual foundations of the ratio and residual income 
approaches, the advantages and disadvantages of each, possible modifications of 
each, as well as technical issues involved in operationalising and applying the 
measures. The paper does not produce an operational residual income standard and 
does not assess the extent and distribution of affordability problems in Australia on 
various measures. 
While the paper does not break new ground conceptually, it does provide the most 
comprehensive discussion of the basic issues in the Australian context. With regard to 
residual income measures in particular, it draws attention to the use of the Henderson 
 37
 poverty line and budget standards, citing the work on the former by Bradbury et al. 
(1986, 1987) and Karmel (1998a), and on the latter by Burke and Ralston (2003), both 
of which were discussed above. In their Technical Appendix, Gabriel et al. compare 
potential measures of non-housing expenditures that could be used for residual 
income standards for an array of household types (pp.48–50): the low cost budget 
standard, modest but adequate budget standard, average household expenditures 
from the HES and the Henderson poverty line. Apart from the expectedly large 
differences among household types, the comparison reveals (pp.49–50): 
The low cost budget standard (excluding housing) varies from 25 per cent to 
almost 50 per cent more than the poverty line for households with head not in 
the workforce. The modest but adequate budget standard (excluding housing) 
varies from 50 per cent above to almost double the poverty line for households 
with a head in the workforce. The modest but adequate standard (excluding 
housing) varies from being half of the HES data for equivalent households to 
25 per cent higher. 
Rather than then making the case for one or another of these measures, or 
suggesting comparative analysis of the sensitivity of empirically determined 
affordability problems to the choice, they remain frustratingly noncommittal (p.50): 
‘The conclusion that can be drawn is that it is unlikely that it will be possible to get 
agreement on what is the most appropriate measure to use.’ 
Yates and Gabriel (2006) provide detailed empirical data on the extent and distribution 
of housing affordability problems in Australia from the 2002–03 Survey of Income and 
Housing. They have primarily used the 30/40 ratio standard of ‘housing stress’ 
(adjusted for equivalised incomes) for their detailed analysis, but have also computed 
the number of moderate income and higher income households paying at least 30 per 
cent of income for housing, and most notably have also estimated the extent and 
distribution of affordability problems on residual income approaches based on both 
the low cost budget standard and the after-housing poverty line (pp.35–40). Their 
aggregate results are as follows (p.viii, p.ix): 
Based on a low cost budget standard estimate of non-housing needs: 
Æ 1.4 million lower income households have insufficient income after meeting their 
housing needs to maintain a frugal standard of living. 
Æ These represent 44 per cent of all lower income households (compared with the 
28% estimate derived from a 30/40 rule). 
Based on an after-housing poverty line estimate of non-housing needs: 
Æ 947 000 lower income households, representing 31 per cent of all lower income 
households, have insufficient income to meet their non-housing needs. 
They have computed and compared the numbers in, and incidence of, housing stress 
using both the two residual income as well as the 30/40 measures for a number of 
demographic, tenure and geographic variables (Table 3.6, p.38). This work is thus the 
most extensive done on the extent and distribution of housing affordability stress for 
Australia as a whole based upon the residual income approach. 
Independent of the AHURI papers under National Research Venture 3, in recent years 
there have two strands of affordability analysis explicitly devoted to the residual 
income approach operationalised for the most part with budget standards. One strand 
has focused on affordability for low income households in private rental housing 
(Waite & Henman 2006; Waite et al. 2009). The other has considered home purchase 
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 affordability for moderate as well as lower income households (Smith 2009; Stone et 
al. 2010). Both strands are very attentive to the policy relevance of their approach. 
After summarising the limitations of the ratio standard, introducing the SPRC budget 
standards and summarising the advantages and disadvantages of the residual income 
approach by Gabriel et al. (2005), Waite and Henman emphasise (2006, pp.198–9): 
‘The two aspects of budget standards which we see as particularly important in 
measuring housing affordability relate to equivalence scales and geographical 
sensitivity.’ 
Adapting and updating the SPRC budget standards, Waite and Henman have 
constructed budget standards for 66 household types for each of 30 Queensland 
geographical divisions. They then consider two approaches to assess the effects of 
housing (p.201): 
The first is to calculate a budget standard which includes a normative 
assessment of housing costs and compare household disposable income with 
that ‘before housing’ budget standard. In that case, a household is regarded as 
being ‘before housing poor (or stressed) if their household disposable income 
is less than the budget standard for their household situation. The second 
approach is to compare a household’s living standard after paying their 
housing costs. In this instance, a household is regarded as ‘after housing poor’ 
(or stressed) if their household disposable income after paying rent is less than 
the relevant budget standard without housing costs. 
There are several good reasons for using ‘after housing’ measures, which 
implicitly equate budget standards housing costs as actual housing costs. 
Local housing markets may be more or less diverse, both in price and in 
quality, and this diversity is ignored by using average prices. The presence or 
absence of a low cost sector within local rental markets will always be an 
important determinant of the capacity for low-income households to locate a 
home they can afford to rent. 
Applying their standards to Queensland Centrelink recipients in private rental, they 
found that 63 per cent were below the low cost after-housing budget standard in 2002, 
compared with 34 per cent paying over 30 per cent of income for housing (p.205). 
Results are also presented for a set of consolidated household types (pp.202–5) and 
for each geographical division (pp.207–9). Their work is thus complementary to that of 
Yates and Gabriel (2006), providing much finer-grained social and geographical detail 
for Queensland, but none for the rest of Australia. 
Waite et al. (2009) add the time dimension to their earlier residual income affordability 
analysis and extend it across the country, with budget standards derived for regional 
and remote areas as well as capital cities. Because they have used the Centrelink 
client dataset, they have been able to carry out longitudinal analysis to examine the 
‘dynamics of financial hardship and housing need’ of households in their sample over 
a three-year period. The sophistication of analysis is unprecedented and has 
important policy implications (p.10): 
This combination of longitudinal Centrelink data and budget standards has 
produced a surprisingly rich analytic tool. The resulting data model provides 
important new evidence on the duration and type of need experienced by 
various categories of low income renters, which in turn supports policy 
development around the timing and nature of government support needed by 
various groups. 
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 By contrast, the affordability models developed by Smith (2009) and Stone et al. 
(2010) have been designed as tools to assess whether, and at what maximum price, 
households can afford to purchase homes in a more realistic way than conventionally 
used by the real estate industry and policy-makers. 
Smith’s model has several distinctive features. First, it is intended as a computer-
based tool primarily for use by consumers (p.5): 
The primary purpose of the model is to create greater awareness amongst 
home purchasers of the total potential costs involved in their purchase over a 
specified time frame. The model has been primarily developed for use by 
potential purchasers of a property so that they can carry out an independent 
and comprehensive evaluation of potential costs involved. 
Second, it takes into account the total costs of purchasing and owning a property: 
capital/acquisition costs; pre-purchase costs, finance costs, and operational costs. 
Due to the limited amount of data that has been available on housing maintenance, 
repairs and improvements, Smith analysed over 500 property inspection reports to 
generate the cost inputs for the latter component of the model. 
Third, it computes the after-housing residual income that would be available to a 
household if they were to purchase the property (p.5): 
The affordability model is based on the ‘Residual Affordability Measurement’ 
technique which identifies the after-housing income of a purchaser. The 
concept of the model is that it will analyse the total potential costs of a 
purchase over a specified time frame and average that back to an average 
cost per week. This will then be compared to the purchaser’s average net 
income per week over the same time period. The purchaser can then evaluate 
whether their ‘residual’ income per week (after allowance for their housing 
costs) is affordable for their individual circumstances and lifestyle. 
While Smith assumes that the household itself would assess the sufficiency of this 
residual income, he also states (p.5): ‘It will also have potential application by financial 
institutions, financial advisors, government housing authorities and other bodies 
involved in the provision of housing information/advice.’ In such contexts, the 
approach presumably could be used with normative standards for residual income 
such as that provided by after-housing budget standards. His model is thus a very 
creative and potentially highly useful approach with application in a variety of arenas. 
Stone et al. (2010) also developed a computer model for assessing affordability for 
home purchasers using the residual income approach. This was developed for the 
Victorian Department of Planning and Community Development (DPCD) for use in 
analysing housing markets, planning and policy development. As with Smith’s model, 
despite its primary purpose, it offers the potential for use by others, including 
consumers and the real estate and finance industries, as well as being adaptable for 
renter affordability. This AHURI study is designed to take the model developed for the 
DPCD much further, extending it to more household types, to private and public rental 
as well as purchase, and to illustrate its potential for a range of policy purposes (see 
Part B). 
The model assesses affordability based on both of the SPRC non-housing budget 
elements—low cost and modest but adequate—indexed for price changes since the 
budget standards were established. It computes affordability for four prototypical 
household types and for a broad range of gross annual incomes. Income taxes, as 
well as income-based tax benefits and credits, are computed, to produce disposable 
incomes. Subtracting the SPRC non-housing budget elements from disposable 
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 income yields maximum affordable housing costs. Subtracting recurring housing costs 
other than mortgages (rates, insurance, maintenance and repairs) from maximum 
affordable housing costs yields maximum affordable mortgage payment. Based on 
user-set parameters for purchase and mortgage financing terms, the model then 
computes maximum affordable mortgage payment and maximum affordable purchase 
price—all as a function of gross income, household type and SPRC non-housing 
standard. 
To illustrate the utility of the model for housing market analysis, Stone et al. (2010) 
have applied the affordability standards for 2009 to detailed 2008 Valuer General’s 
property sales data for four rings of Greater Melbourne. This analysis is intended to 
demonstrate which geographical locations would be affordable to which types of 
households, at which levels of income, and under which mortgage conditions. 
This work by Smith and by Stone et al. (2010) on affordability for prospective home 
purchasers thus represents a new and significant addition to the potential for the 
residual income approach. Their models demonstrate how the approach can provide a 
practical and workable tool for decision making by consumers, policy-makers and the 
housing industry. Moving beyond the theoretical and conceptual literature, it is 
complementary to the gradually increasing numbers of studies of housing needs and 
problems that include or emphasise findings from application of the residual approach. 
3.4 Residual income studies in other countries 
Over the past decade, awareness and application of the residual income concept of 
housing affordability has interested researchers and spread to several other parts of 
the world, most particularly China and continental Europe. 
Two papers have used a residual income standard to examine affordability and rent 
setting policy in Hong Kong public housing (Hui 2001; Yip & Lau 2002). Hui draws 
primarily and explicitly upon the UK literature to critique the ratio approach and then 
construct in considerable detail the residual income approach from economic first 
principles, following Hancock (1993). Deriving an operational residual income 
standard for Hong Kong and applying it to a sample of public housing tenants, Hui 
concludes that existing rent policy based on the ratio standard leaves large numbers 
of tenants unable to meet their non-housing needs at a minimal level of adequacy. 
The conclusion and policy recommendation (p.49) is that the Hong Kong Housing 
Authority ‘should seriously consider the economic concept of affordability and develop 
both housing and non-housing consumption yardsticks to improve its domestic 
housing policy’. 
Yip and Lau (2002) have not recapitulated the theoretical arguments, instead focusing 
primarily on the details and contradictions of public housing rent setting policies in 
Hong Kong. Showing awareness of some of the residual income literature, they have 
computed the residual incomes of households on the Rent Assistance scheme, 
concluding that (p.14) ‘the Rent Assistance scheme still cannot offer poor tenants any 
assurance of adequate resources for daily necessities’. 
Concerned with the affordability implications of the promotion of home purchasing in 
the increasingly market-driven environment of Beijing, Yang and Shen (2008) have 
constructed a residual income model for a minimum budget a family would need to 
purchase a ‘standard’ unit (p.2): 
Housing affordability is not a simple question of comparing house prices to 
family income. Affordability is a complicated concept that is difficult to define 
because it is influenced by the subjective values and differing social 
expectations of consumers. It is further challenged by the large disparities in 
 41
 family income and in housing quality in urban areas. In this context, the 
traditional measure of affordability, which is the ratio of aggregate income to 
house price, might lead to measurement errors that distort the targets of public 
policy and the evaluation of performance in an effort to achieve those targets. 
In this study, we develop the ‘residual income’ concept of house affordability in 
Beijing. We identify a ‘standard’ unit with minimum required attributes, whose 
value is calculated using a hedonic price equation. We then estimate the 
minimum budget requirement that will allow a household to afford this standard 
unit, considering the cost of non-housing necessities and the costs of financing. 
Comparing actual average family income to the minimum required budget, we 
estimate housing affordability for moderate- to low-income families. Therefore, 
in our proposed model, housing affordability is defined not only in terms of 
family income. It is defined by an analysis of the multiple determinants of 
demand: income; borrowing ability; non-housing costs; and current housing 
wealth. 
Thus, apart from limiting their model to a ‘standard’ housing unit and not including 
housing costs other than financing, there are some similarities to the work of Smith 
(2009) and of Stone et al. (2010) in Australia. They draw extensively and in detail 
upon the US and UK for the conceptual and some of the methodological foundations 
for their model, but go well beyond the extant literature in the methodological 
sophistication used to construct their ‘standard’ unit and their analysis of the Beijing 
housing market. 
In Europe, Lux (2007) has proposed a ‘quasi-normative’ approach to establishing 
‘optimal’ rent-income ratios in social housing in the Czech Republic. He has 
extensively cited the affordability literature, alluding to the residual income approach, 
and presented a sophisticated mathematical model that combines behavioural and 
normative elements. Nonetheless, he has been unable to transcend the traditional 
paradigm, concluding that (p.1120) ‘the reference point on affordability should be the 
rent-income ratio between 13 per cent and 15 per cent’. 
By contrast, Heylen and Haffner (2010) have explicitly formulated a budget standards 
residual income approach to affordability. Drawing upon the UK, US and Australian 
literature, they restate the logic and issues in the ratio and residual income 
approaches, and then present an operational residual standard based on the non-
housing components of recently-developed low cost and modest cost budget 
standards for the Netherlands and Flanders. 
They have applied the affordability standards to households of various tenures and 
household characteristics in the two regions, in comparison with the conventional 30 
per cent of income standard. They find that the results on the residual income and 
ratio standards are not dramatically different in the aggregate, but by tenure they are. 
Most notably, they find that: (a) the situation of public renters is considerably worse 
than suggested by the ratio approach; and (b) both private and public renters appear 
relatively worse off under the residual income approach, and owner-occupiers 
relatively better off, than suggested by the conventional standard (p.10). They note 
that these findings certainly have ‘quite some policy consequences’ (p.17), but do not 
draw out this conclusion. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Over the past half century, the traditional ‘rule of thumb’ ratio concept of housing 
affordability has been subjected to growing criticism for its lack of theoretical and 
logical justification, and its distortion of the lived experience of households, with 
consequences, among others, for the equity and efficiency of housing policies based 
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 upon this approach. Constructively, much of the criticism has been accompanied by 
the formulation of a competitive alternative—the residual income approach—which 
has been demonstrated to possess the theoretical and logical soundness missing 
from the ratio approach. Nonetheless, the ratio paradigm has remained dominant due 
to its familiarity and simplicity. 
Some of the objections to the residual income approach on practical—as distinct from 
theoretical—grounds have begun to be overcome through increasingly widespread 
use and acceptance of the non-housing elements of indicative budget standards as a 
sound and robust source for operationalising the approach. As the principal 
methodological challenge has been met in this way, an expanding array of projects 
have been undertaken using the residual income standard, beginning to demonstrate 
its utility as a finely honed instrument for analysing housing problems and needs, 
assessing policy questions, and guiding decision making. 
So far, this Positioning Paper has reported on the application of the residual income or 
budget standard method as an alternative way of understanding a range of problems 
relating to housing affordability. However, it has not provided any applications. The 
paper now outlines in preliminary form the method used in modelling the residual 
income for a range of household types and for both home purchase and private rental, 
and then illustrates the usefulness of the concept via applications to the Melbourne 
housing market. While there is some fine-tuning of the method, the early findings 
suggest that, for some household types, the 30/40 rule overstates their lack of 
affordability and, for others, understates it. The findings also help to explain how, 
despite Melbourne’s high prices (median of around $500 000), these are still 
affordable for many households and why single persons and childless couples are 
becoming large players in the purchase market and many families are being trapped 
in private rental. 
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 PART B: APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
4 INTRODUCTION 
As in other countries, a number of developments in Australia justify a new and more 
detailed examination of the implications of the residual income logic for understanding 
housing affordability problems and shaping policy and practice. First, the problems 
have well and truly reached up the income distribution ladder such that they are no 
longer limited to the lowest income tiers or to renters, compounded by greater 
diversity of household types with very disparate living costs which is not captured by 
benchmark measures. Second, the decline in the amount of public housing, growth of 
the community housing sector, and large numbers of rent subsidised households in 
private rental are raising questions about differential rent setting practices across the 
sectors, with obvious implications for horizontal equity of affordability. Third, the 
existing benchmark model appears limited in its ability to explain what is actually 
happening in the housing market. For example, it would suggest that prices have 
reached a level of affordability where there could not be any further growth, but in fact 
they keep growing. And from another perspective Berry et al. (2010) show that, even 
in the worst trough of the global financial crisis, mortgage default in Australia was very 
small at the same time as benchmark measures were indicating widespread financial 
stress. 
From another perspective, the US post sub-prime housing crisis has raised questions 
about how best to assess housing risk, given all the evidence from the US— and 
there is some here—that banks themselves are no longer using a benchmark method 
but a non-transparent residual income model. Recent Australian affordability research 
(Yates 2007; Tanton et al. 2008; Hulse et al. 2010) indicates a substantial number of 
renting and purchasing households have housing costs well in excess of the 30 per 
cent benchmark, while a simple plugging in of data to any financial institution’s 
mortgage calculator will reveal that they have clearly departed from any semblance of 
a benchmark method, although since the global financial crisis they have tightened 
their lending criteria. The Commonwealth Bank calculator as of May 2010 would, for 
example, lend to a household with $50 000 income and no other debt a mortgage with 
repayments of $19 764, which represents 39.5 per cent of income. The basis for this 
is unclear, but one suspects some form of residual income model. 
As Part A has pointed out, the limitations with the benchmark method are not unique 
to Australia, and others are grappling with how best to make the method operational. 
We believe that this research is designed to take the method to a deeper level of 
analysis than has been the case anywhere else. 
Recognising the serious shortcomings of the familiar and widely used ratio approach, 
the study outlines a residual income method that can differentiate potential 
affordability outcomes for various household types across a range of incomes, both 
for home purchase and rental. We operationalise an ownership and rental model with 
the key features of: 
Æ Different indicators for rental, purchase and outright ownership. 
Æ Multiple indicators of affordability for different uses. 
Æ Affordability measures for a broad range of incomes. 
Æ Affordability for four household types. 
Æ Affordability based upon two residual income non-housing standards. 
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 Æ User-set parameters to test market conditions as well as indexed over time. 
Note that, in a number of the examples, the residual income model is compared with a 
30 per cent rule for all income ranges, not just for those below the 40th percentile, 
although we do identify the income point at which 40 per cent income cut-off occurs. 
The reason for extending the analysis is twofold: First, higher income groups 
(particularly with larger families) above this cut-off may also confront risk and severe 
constraints on choice because of affordability issues; and second, the model can also 
be used to get a better understanding of decision making in the housing market and 
submarkets. In the latter case, the drivers of market outcomes are more often higher 
income groups. 
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 5  THE HOME PURCHASE MODEL: FEATURES 
The home purchase and rental markets require separate models as they represent 
quite different sets of actors in terms of incomes, motivations and constraints and, to 
some extent, also have different stock (much more multi-unit accommodation for 
rental) and locational attributes. Perhaps more important in terms of methodology is 
that the housing cost and income measures and assumptions that sit behind these 
tenures but which are required to build the model are different. For example, a renter’s 
income may be boosted by Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA), compared to a 
purchaser who gets no equivalent subsidy, while on the other hand there are ongoing 
costs for owners (rates, repairs etc.) that renters do not have. So let’s start with home 
purchase. For each of the five broad features of the model, the following outlines the 
specific elements. 
1. Multiple indicators of affordability: In this case, six applications of the model are 
developed and exemplified using Melbourne data. In most cases, the indicators 
will translate to Australia generally, but in some cases they are limited to those 
states or territories that have Valuer General’s property sales statistics in unit 
record format. 
Æ Maximum affordable total (mortgage plus non-mortgage) housing cost (per 
year, per month, per week). 
Æ Maximum affordable mortgage payment (per year, per month, per week). 
Æ Maximum affordable mortgage loan. 
Æ Maximum affordable purchase price. 
Æ Minimum savings required to purchase at maximum affordable purchase price. 
Æ Share of houses sold in 2008 with affordable purchase prices. 
2. Affordability for a broad range of incomes: The method allows for calculation of 
affordability indicators for a very large income spectrum, but in the case of home 
purchase the indicators start at $30 000 as it is assumed that purchase is not 
affordable below this level. 
Æ $1000 intervals of gross annual household income. 
Æ From $30 000 to $150 000. 
3. Affordability for four household types: Necessarily the residual income model is 
household specific as that is one of its characteristic features, i.e. the ability to 
reveal that different household types have very different expenditures and 
therefore very different abilities to borrow. The numbers of types are many once 
permutations of marital status and number of children are taken into account. For 
the purpose of most of this study we concentrate on four indicative types, although 
at some points we do look at more than these: 
Æ Single adult, no children. 
Æ Couple, no children. 
Æ Couple with two children. 
Æ Single adult with one child. 
4. Affordability based upon two residual income non-housing standards: The 
development of a residual income model of housing affordability requires 
indicative budget standards for different household types. Australia is fortunate to 
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 have the two standards developed by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) 
at the University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998): 
Æ Low cost budget non-housing elements indexed for price changes. 
Æ Modest but adequate budget non-housing elements indexed for price changes. 
It should be recognised that these budget standards are indicative and some 
elements have been questioned, notably child care costs and housing costs 
(DFaCs 2007). The housing estimates are not relevant for this study as they 
emerge as a residual from the other data, and the child care methodological 
issues are not so great as to change the expenditure estimates in a way that could 
invalidate the findings here. However, some minor adjustments will be made for 
child costs in the Final Report. There are also certain consumption items whose 
importance has changed over time (e.g. mobile phones, broadband) and these will 
be factored into the final analysis, along with a measure of debt which has also 
increased greatly since the SPRC study. 
There is also the problem with the SPRC budget standard that it assumes 
expenditures are very similar across Australia. This would certainly be the case in 
capital cities and adjacent regional areas, but there are parts of Australia, e.g. 
remote areas or resource intensive areas (often one and the same), where many 
items by virtue of transport costs or high commercial rents are much higher. The 
model therefore cannot have applicability in such areas. 
5. User-set parameters to test market conditions as well as index over time: The 
budget standards were developed in the late 1990s and therefore the parameters 
of any measures or indicators based on this standard have to be adapted for 
current circumstances. These include: 
Æ Month and year of affordability standard. 
Æ Appropriate CPI for selected month and year. 
Æ Non-mortgage recurring housing costs (rates, insurance, maintenance, 
repairs). 
Æ Mortgage loan-to-value ratio (equal to 1 minus the deposit ratio). 
Æ Mortgage loan term (years). 
Æ Mortgage interest rates. 
Æ Mortgage establishment costs (legal etc.). 
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 6 OPERATIONALISING A HOME PURCHASE 
RESIDUAL INCOME STANDARD 
There are three major practical issues that have to be dealt with in translating the 
residual income logic into an operational affordability standard: how to specify the 
monetary level of a minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter items other than 
taxes; how to scale this standard for various types of households; and how to deal 
with personal taxes. 
The well-established budget standards concepts and methodology have provided an 
appropriate basis for establishing a normative measure of an after-tax residual income. 
This takes into account the actual cost of a basic ‘market basket’ of necessities. By 
explicitly identifying and pricing the various elements in the basket, non-housing items 
can be extracted, so that their total cost is not an arbitrary percentage of the total 
budget. 
The authors who have taken the budget standards approach in the US have used the 
non-shelter, non-tax components of Bureau of Labor Statistics ‘lower budgets’, 
updated using corresponding components of the CPI (Stone 1993, Appendix A). For 
the UK, the non-shelter components of the Family Budget Unit’s ‘Low cost but 
acceptable’ budgets have been used (Stone 2006e). For Australia, the SPRC ‘low 
cost’ indicative budgets, which are conceptually and methodologically similar to the 
US and UK low cost budgets, have seen somewhat similar application in developing 
and applying a residual income affordability standard (Waite & Henman 2006; Yates & 
Gabriel 2006). Furthermore, the SPRC has also developed a somewhat higher 
‘modest but adequate’ budget, following similar assumptions and giving it the same 
name as intermediate budgets developed much earlier in the US. 
The availability of the two SPRC budget standards has been essential for this project, 
making it possible to devise and apply operational residual income affordability scales 
based on both the very conservative standard of living defined by the low cost budget 
and the more ‘modest’ standard defined by the modest but adequate budget. 
The second practical issue involves translating a specified qualitative standard of 
adequacy for non-housing items into quantitative monetary amounts that differ by 
household size and type. For the US and UK, this has involved the use of equivalence 
scales because detailed standards budgets have been devised for only a few 
prototypical household types (Stone 1993, Appendix A; Stone 2006b). For Australia, 
this is not necessary, for the most part, because detailed low cost budgets have been 
derived for 20 household types and modest but adequate budgets for 26 types, the 
greater number for the latter reflecting a greater array of owner-occupier household 
types (Saunders et al. 1998). 
Finally, there is the matter of taxes. The ratio approach has always manifested a great 
deal of confusion and inconsistency as to whether the standard should be based upon 
gross household income or disposable income. By contrast, the residual income 
approach is unambiguous: because the non-housing standard provided by the 
indicative budgets is a consumption standard, it is a household’s disposable income 
that faces the tension between housing and non-housing necessities. This means that, 
to the extent that datasets and policy analysis are based upon gross household 
incomes, prototypical taxes and income-based government benefits need to be 
computed as a function of income as well as household type in order to determine 
disposable incomes and thus fully operationalise a residual income standard. 
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 Appendix A outlines in detail the features of the model and its applications to two 
household types: a single person and a couple with two children. The following 
section examines some of the implications of the model using these two household 
types as case studies. 
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 7 IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOME PURCHASE 
MODEL 
One of the paradoxes of recent housing affordability data is that posed by the 
question: If the home purchase affordability problem is so bad, how can low-moderate 
income households still afford to buy? Using the residual income method discussed 
above, we were able to calculate the maximum weekly mortgage costs affordable for 
household incomes above $30 000 per annum. Here we illustrate the findings for a 
single income household (Figure 2) and a couple with two children (Figure 3). Each of 
these figures show that the weekly mortgage affordable for all incomes between 
$30 000 and $150 000 and for two versions of the budget standard (modest and low) 
and two for the 30 per cent benchmarks (gross and disposable income). The reason 
for showing both gross and net income for comparative purposes is that Australian 
researchers have not yet settled on what should be the ‘official’ 30/40 practice in 
regard to tax treatment and both tend to be used. The 40th percentile is identified at 
the point of the vertical line. 
Figure 2: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, single person household 
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 Figure 3: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget 
standard and two measures of housing affordability, couple with two children 
 
Note: Details of the methodology employed in Figures 1 and 2 are set out in Appendix A. 
This analysis has three important implications. First, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 
above, there is a big difference in purchasing affordability for the two household types. 
A single person willing to live on the modest but adequate budget standard can afford 
to pay much more per week on housing than using a maximum of 30 per cent of 
income benchmark, however measured. The situation is very different for the couple 
with two children, due to their higher non-housing expenditures. Up to the 40th 
percentile of household income for purchasers, using the modest but adequate budget 
standard illustrates that they can afford to pay less than if the 30 per cent of 
household income, however measured, was applied. In addition, when just using the 
residual method, the couple with two children on the same income as a single person, 
e.g. $65 000, have much less mortgage capacity. 
Second, many people have speculated on how some low-moderate income 
homebuyers are able to afford the high prices of recent years, particularly if they are 
first-time purchasers who do not have more than a minimum deposit. The residual 
income method, based on budget standards, offers an explanation. For a single 
person, single income household, there is little difference between the amount that 
they could borrow using the two measures. However, on an income of $65 000 per 
annum, a single person would only be able to borrow $255,000 if they are not to 
exceed 30 per cent of their income. Using the modest but adequate budget standard, 
they could afford to borrow up to $455 000,11 as illustrated in Figure 4 below. The 
household might be living modestly to achieve the latter loan size but, provided there 
were no other issues that affected their expenditures (e.g. maintenance payments to 
children of a previous marriage), they could afford the repayments if this is how they 
set their priorities. Of course, the more one moves up the income scale, the more that 
it could be argued that a modest budget standard is too modest for such groups and 
                                                
11 Assumptions are: 10 per cent deposit, mortgage repayable over 25 years, average interest rate 6 per 
cent.  
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 they would spend more on other expenditure items. That is very likely the case, but 
what the budget standard does show is the maximum potential for dwelling purchase 
if a household was willing to make the expenditure sacrifices. 
Figure 4: Comparison of affordable loans for single person, single income households 
on different levels of income, comparing two measures of housing affordability 
 
Source: Amortisation data derived from Mortgage-X Mortgage Information Service, <http://mortgage-
x.com/calculators/amortization.htm>.  
Note: The 30 per cent is calculated on gross household income. 
The situation is very different for the couple with two children (not illustrated). Up to 
the 40th percentile of household income for home purchasers ($76 000 per annum), 
they can borrow less using the modest but adequate budget standard than using a 
simple 30 per cent of household income approach. For the same household income of 
$65 000 per annum, they cannot afford to devote more than 17 per cent of their 
income to mortgage repayments and, using this measure, could only afford to borrow 
$151 000 compared to $277 000 using the 30 per cent of household income ratio. The 
additional living expenses of households with children constrain their ability to borrow 
and therefore to afford housing even in lower price areas. This analysis is consistent 
with the findings of Hulse et al. (2010, Chapter 5) who, in their research on changes in 
low-moderate income home purchasing patterns, noted a sharp decline in the number 
of low-moderate income purchasers who are households with children and a very big 
increase in the proportion who are single person, single income households, with 
these changes being much greater than those explainable by demographic change 
alone.  
Many low-moderate purchasers have been able to afford the higher house prices of 
recent years as long as they are willing to forego a few luxuries and live to a modest 
 52
 but adequate budget standard. If they are willing to forego a little more and live on the 
low cost budget standard, they can borrow even more. 
Third, the analysis also suggests the notion of price points for affordable housing for 
low-moderate income purchasers. Table 1 below shows four different household types 
the affordable price point, i.e. that purchase price at which a property is affordable 
based on an income of $50 000. The assumptions to construct the price points are in 
Appendix B. As the table shows, for a single person with a 20 per cent deposit, a 
$50 000 income will buy them a $266 000 dwelling using the moderate budget 
standard, but for a couple with two children only a dwelling of $48 000 is affordable. In 
the context of metropolitan Australia, few dwellings would be affordable for the single 
person and none would be for the family. Pushing the income levels higher would 
change the price points, as would switching to a low cost budget standard. However, 
at this stage the objective is to illustrate the concept of the price point and its variation 
across household types. The Final Report will provide data for other income ranges 
and a template for calculating whatever combinations of income, interest rate and 
household type are desired. 
Table 1: First home buyer price points for different household types, based on annual 
gross income of $50 000 and 10 per cent and 20 per cent deposits 
 Single 
person 
Couple 
only 
Sole parent 
with one 
child 
Couple with 
two children 
Home purchase (deposit 10%) 
Modest budget standard $266,598 $162,448 $228,636 $48,872 
Assumed savings $37,360 $21,737 $31,665 $6,810 
30/40 rule gross $157,208 $157,208 $181,584 $187,590 
Assumed savings $20,951 $20,951 $24,608 $25,509 
30/40 rule nett $122,425 $134,806 $147,981 $165,188 
Assumed savings $15,931 $17,591 $19,567 $22,148 
Home purchase (deposit 20%) 
Modest budget standard $299,923 $182,754 $257,215 $54,981 
Assumed savings $72,351 $43,058 $61,674 $13,066 
30/40 rule gross $176,859 $176,859 $204,282 $211,039 
Assumed savings $41,585 $41,585 $48,440 $50,130 
30/40 rule nett $137,729 $151,656 $166,478 $185,836 
Assumed savings $31,802 $35,284 $38,990 $43,829 
 
There is another reason why many low-moderate income households can afford to 
buy and the explanation has relevance to the spatial polarisation of Australian cities. 
By taking the residual income and associated mortgage capacity for a given 
household type and applying that model to the Victorian Valuer General’s unit record 
sales data, it is possible to determine where households for any given income can 
purchase. Figure 5 below shows the percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to 
a couple with two children with a 10 per cent deposit and a 6 per cent interest rate and 
shows (a) the degree to which few properties are affordable anywhere below $60 000 
and (b) the differences between regions. The growth areas of Melbourne are almost 
universally affordable for this household type so long as they have around $85 000 
household income, while this income would get this household type a choice of less 
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 than 30 per cent of the inner city. Such data enables a better understanding of what is 
happening in the market: low-moderate income households can still purchase, but 
only in very spatially constrained markets on the fringe of metropolitan Melbourne. 
The ability to use the method for such submarket analysis is only as good as the 
availability of unit record property valuation data, and some states and territories 
would be more limited in their ability to apply the model by virtue of lack of data, e.g. 
South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
Figure 5: Percentage of 2008 Melbourne properties affordable to couple with two 
children using the modest budget standard 
Percentage of 2008 Property Sales
Affordable to Couple with Children, 6% Interest Rate, 10% Deposit
 Modest Non‐Housing Standard 
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Source: Victorian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2008 and residual income calculations as 
documented in Appendix A. 
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 8 THE RENTER MODEL 
The construction of the renter model is broadly the same as for ownership but 
requires some rejigging in a number of aspects. Reviewing stages 1 to 12 of the 
ownership application of the model (see Appendix A), the ones that remain the same 
for rental are: 
1. Non-housing consumption standards. 
2. Indexing using appropriate consumer price indexes. 
3. Income tax computations. 
4. Income-based benefits and credits. 
Areas that require change are as follows. 
Income assumptions: 
Unlike home purchase, no minimum income for computations is assumed, as rental is 
the only option for low income earners and therefore even the lowest income earners 
are assumed to be requiring accommodation in this sector. One of the issues in 
extending the income range down to zero is that Centrelink benefits and any credits 
become dominant in determining disposable income. Where most purchasers over 
$30 000 have largely earned income with some credits such as family allowances, 
most renters under $30 000 are dependent on some level of benefit. 
This is simply illustrated in Figure 6 below, using the example of a single person 
household. Annual earned income starts at zero but actual disposable income is 
higher, representing the pension or disability benefit and the fact that no tax is paid on 
such income. Above some point, in this case around $21 000, the disposable income 
becomes less than earned income as the cut-in and application of marginal tax rates 
reduces actual income as income rises. 
Figure 6: Earned v disposable income, single person 
 
Rent Assistance 
Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) is a non-taxable income supplement payment 
added on to the pension, allowance or benefit of eligible Income Support customers 
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 who rent in the private rental market and in eligible community housing. It is paid at 
the rate of 75 cents for every dollar of rent above the specified threshold until the 
maximum rate is reached. Maximum rates and thresholds vary according to 
household type and number of children. 
Methodologically, CRA can be treated in two ways. It can be treated as an income 
payment and added to a household’s income as calculated in the homeownership 
model, i.e. the Disposable Income equals Gross Household Adult Income from 
Employment minus taxes plus tax benefits, credits and CRA. Thus, the ‘Maximum 
Affordable Rent’ equals Disposable Income minus the relevant budget standard. 
Alternatively it can be seen as a supplement to the rent, which means that the 
disposable income remains that of Gross Household Adult Income from Employment 
minus taxes, but plus tax benefits and any credits. Thus the Maximum Affordable Rent 
equals disposable income minus the relevant budget standard plus CRA. In most 
cases the result will be same. For the purposes of this study, the latter method is used, 
because the former does not easily allow for establishing the amount of CRA that 
would be available to a particular household type. 
8.1 Rental examples and associated issues 
The rental application of the model is indicative only as work is still continuing at this 
stage. 
Using the disposable income and the CRA added to the budget standard, Figure 7 
below shows, both for the low cost and modest budget standard and for comparative 
purposes the 30 per cent benchmark, what level of rent is affordable at each level of 
income. 
As with the ownership data, this data clearly reveals differences between the 
benchmark model and the budget standard model. First, for single renters, it would 
suggest that above some income level, i.e. $25 000 to $30 000 depending on which 
budget standard is used, they can afford more by way of rent than indicated by the 
budget standard, with the difference widening as incomes increase. By contrast, 
below some minimum level of income, the opposite holds true: the benchmark method 
overstates the degree of affordability. Second, and related to these differences, is that 
the budget standard method offers a better explanation of the rental market dynamics. 
One of the puzzles of recent years has been how rents have been able to increase to 
the degree that they have done, given the extent of income resistance that would be 
suggested by the benchmark method, i.e. the lack of affordability of rents should have 
acted as a drag on the rental market. That this has not been the case is suggested by 
the budget standard method which indicated an ability of any single person household 
over $30 000 to pay more than we previously thought affordable. 
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 Figure 7: Rental affordability using different affordability measures, single person 
 
Turning to a couple with two children (Figure 8 below), the story in broad terms is the 
same, although much more visible. Note here that (a) the income level starts at 
$32 000 as, factoring in all the benefits for a household of this type, that is the 
minimum income and (b) the annual disposable income between $38 000 and 
$43 000 is not linear as incomes actually drop back a bit when certain benefit tapers 
cut in. The affordable rent is much the same between $38 000 and $47 000 for the 
low cost budget standard and the 30 per cent benchmark. After the $47 000 income 
point, this household type’s ability to pay more rent without experiencing an 
affordability problem is much greater under the low cost budget standard than the 
benchmark one. However, if the modest budget standard is used, we see a major 
problem. Such are the demands of other expenses for this household type that below 
$45 000 no rent is affordable, and any real capacity to afford rents is not achieved 
until the mid-$50 000s. 
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 Figure 8: Rental affordability using different affordability measures, couple with two 
children 
Whether a rent is affordable is one housing issue. Whether there are any properties 
available to rent at an affordable level where a household wants to locate is another. 
Victoria has a Residential Tenancies Bond Authority (RTBA) which holds all 
residential tenancy bonds for rental properties, including long-term caravans and 
rooming houses, houses and flats. The bonds are held in trust for landlords/agents 
and tenants, or owners and residents, giving all parties equal say on how bonds 
should be repaid when a rental agreement (also called a lease) ends. When a new 
lease is taken on, the landlord or agent provides the RTBA with the bond along with 
information including property type, number of bedrooms, rent and address. 
Confidentialised RTBA unit records thus enable us to calculate for each household 
type the percentage of appropriate dwelling units available for Melbourne using the 
low cost, modest budget standard and the 30/40 benchmark method. Table 2 below 
looks at a single person household and applies the Canadian occupancy standard, 
which has a single person occupying a one-bedroom dwelling. The table also shows 
boarding house data as this is potentially an option (but perhaps a worst outcome) for 
this household type. The post codes of the rental addresses have been amalgamated 
into inner, middle, and outer areas of Melbourne. 
Table 2 shows the affordable rent for each income group and each method and the 
percentage of dwellings that were affordable and reveals a very different story when 
comparing residual income methods to the benchmark method. Taking a reasonably 
low income, e.g. $35 000, and using the moderate budget standard (our preferred 
standard), 30 per cent are affordable overall and, in the middle ring, 47 per cent of 
properties are affordable. By contrast, for the same income, the 30/40 benchmark has 
only 3 per cent of properties affordable overall, and in the middle ring only 4 per cent. 
This is a very different affordability story. The $30 000 income level is a telling one as, 
if one uses the modest budget standard, affordability drops away almost to the levels 
of the benchmark method, and below $20 000 there is no rental property affordable on 
the low cost budget standard. Even if we were to use the low cost budget standard 
(not illustrated), below $20 000 there is nothing affordable. Thus, for households such 
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 as aged single pensioners with no other income sources, no amount of adjustment of 
expenditures could find such households an affordable dwelling. 
Table 2: Single person: percentage of available one-bedroom rental properties by inner, 
middle and outer Melbourne municipalities, 1 January 2010 to 1 June 2010 
  Modest 30/40 rules 
Gross Disposable Modest Inner Middle Outer Total 30/40 Inner Middle Outer Total 
$12,000 $17,929 $12 0% 0% 0% 0% $143 0% 3% 1% 22% 
$15,000 $18,949 $32 0% 0% 0% 0% $154 0% 2% 4% 1% 
$20,000 $20,649 $75 0% 0% 0% 0% $171 1% 4% 8% 3% 
$25,000 $22,349 $132 0% 1% 2% 1% $186 1% 6% 13% 5% 
$30,000 $26,400 $175 1% 5% 9% 3% $152 0% 2% 4% 1% 
$35,000 $30,650 $257 17% 47% 35% 30% $177 1% 5% 9% 3% 
$40,000 $34,150 $324 46% 72% 72% 59% $197 1% 10% 16% 6% 
$45,000 $37,650 $391 74% 85% 92% 80% $217 3% 21% 22% 12% 
$50,000 $41,150 $459 88% 91% 97% 90% $237 8% 34% 27% 20% 
$55,000 $44,650 $526 92% 94% 99% 94% $258 17% 47% 35% 30% 
$60,000 $48,150 $593 95% 96% 99% 96% $278 25% 56% 44% 39% 
   7,713 5,404 2,061 15,178  7,713 5,404 2,061 15,178
Table 3 below looks at the case study of a couple with two children, using the 
Canadian occupancy standard for appropriate room allocations which requires a 
three-bedroom dwelling for this household type. Here the story is slightly different. The 
modest budget standard method reveals less choice than the 30/40 benchmark. A 
couple with two children on $50 000 have no available stock affordable on the modest 
budget standard, while the benchmark method suggests that there is 26 per cent 
affordable, of which the bulk is in the urban fringe. Above $75 000 the position is 
reversed, with the modest budget standard showing that 83 per cent is affordable 
compared to 69 per cent of the benchmark method. Both highlight that it is 
predominantly outer urban areas where there is any real choice for income below 
$70 000, but once an $80 000 income is exceeded, choice in the inner area becomes 
much greater using the modest budget standard than the 30 per cent benchmark. The 
differences raise fundamental questions as to which is most appropriate for our 
understanding of the affordability constraints in Melbourne—or any other city where 
the method is applied—and the dynamics of the housing market. As with the home 
ownership model, the ability to undertake such spatial analysis is limited to cities with 
equivalent data to that of the RTBA. At the time of writing, as far as the authors know, 
only Queensland has comparable data. 
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 Table 3: Couple with two children: Percentage of available three-bedroom rental 
properties by inner, middle and outer Melbourne municipalities, 1 January 2010 to 1 
June 2010 
Annual 
income 
Dis-
posable  
income 
Modest budget standard 30/40% rules (based on disposable 
income) 
Rent 
modest 
Inner Middle Outer Total 30% 
rule 
Inner Middle Outer Total 
$32,000 $45,193 $15 0% 0% 0% 0% $327 3% 18% 70% 44% 
$40,000 $47,274 $55 0% 0% 0% 0% $339 3% 22% 77% 49% 
$45,000 $48,647 $87 0% 0% 0% 0% $281 2% 5% 34% 20% 
$50,000 $51,297 $143 0% 0% 0% 0% $296 2% 6% 44% 26% 
$55,000 $54,550 $210 1% 1% 1% 1% $315 2% 13% 61% 37% 
$60,000 $57,652 $275 2% 3% 27% 15% $333 3% 22% 76% 48% 
$65,000 $60,455 $334 3% 22% 76% 48% $349 3% 26% 82% 53% 
$70,000 $63,258 $393 6% 52% 96% 71% $365 4% 39% 91% 63% 
$75,000 $66,656 $463 16% 76% 99% 83% $385 5% 49% 95% 69% 
$80,000 $70,456 $541 31% 88% 100% 89% $406 8% 59% 97% 75% 
$85,000 $74,256 $619 51% 94% 100% 93% $428 10% 65% 98% 78% 
$90,000 $77,906 $694 69% 97% 100% 96% $449 12% 70% 98% 80% 
Total Properties  1,736 8,248 10,854 20,838  1,736 8,248 10,854 20,838 
As with first home purchasers, it is possible to use the residual income model to 
develop affordable price points for renters and this is shown in Table 4 below. Again, it 
shows for an equivalent income the marked affordability advantage of a single person 
over multiple person households. They have more choice of dwellings in the sense 
that a single person with $50 000 income, on a modest budget standard (the 
affordable rent is $453), can rent anything from a one-bedroom upwards. A couple 
with children have to look for a larger dwelling, e.g. three-bedroom, and consequently 
have much less capacity to afford such. 
Table 4: Affordable rental price points for different household types, based on annual 
gross income of $50 000 
 Single 
person 
Couple 
only 
Sole parent 
with one 
child 
Couple with 
two children 
Renting 
Modest budget standard $453.56 $295.34 $392.24 $129.08 
30/40 rule gross $287.67 $287.67 $323.36 $332.15 
30/40 rule nett $238.48 $254.88 $274.16 $299.35 
Office of Housing rent 
amount 
$239.55 $239.55 $249.05 $259.60 
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 9 CONCLUSION 
This Positioning Paper is not comprehensive in the applications the model can be put 
to, but it suggests the broad directions. The Final Report will expand on the existing 
applications by looking at more household types as well as include new applications 
including relevance for social housing rent setting and comparing Australia’s 
affordability performance with international housing markets. But even at this point, 
the paper illustrates (a) that the work requires a level of methodological detail not 
hitherto undertaken in equivalent studies in Australia or internationally and (b) the 
model’s potential usefulness in providing a critical framework for thinking about 
affordability and for new policy debate. 
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 APPENDIX A 
Methodology 
1. Non-housing consumption standards: 
Æ SPRC low cost and modest but adequate budgets. 
Æ Total budget minus housing. 
Æ The budgets are national, not regional or local. 
Æ However, since housing is the expenditure that varies most by location, while the 
aggregate of other expenditures varies little by location, use of the national total 
budget minus housing is a reasonable approximation for Victoria. 
2. Indexing using appropriate consumer price indexes: 
Æ Because SPRC budgets have separate components for housing and energy, but 
CPI ‘Housing’ includes utilities, it is necessary to utilise: … 
Æ CPI ‘All Items minus Housing and Financial Services’ to index the budgets 
minus the Housing and Energy components. 
Æ CPI ‘Utilities’ to index budget’s Energy component. 
Æ Because CPI ‘All Items minus Housing and Financial Services’ is available only for 
Australia as a whole, not for Victoria or Melbourne, it is necessary to use the 
national CPI elements. 
Æ As with the SPRC budgets, since housing is the expenditure that varies most by 
location, while the aggregate of other expenditures varies little by location, use of 
the national CPI ‘All Items minus Housing and Financial Services’ is reasonable. 
Æ Add results of ‘b’ and ‘c’ to produce indexed normative budget standard (minimum 
adequate residual income) for Non-Housing Consumption including Utilities (home 
energy). 
3. Income assumptions: 
Æ $30 000 is the minimum income for computations as it is assumed that ownership 
is not possible on a lower income unless subsidised. Any rental affordability 
measure, however, would have no lower income cut-off. 
Æ Because of the $30 000 income cut-off, household income is predominantly from 
employment, although at lower income levels households are eligible for certain 
income benefits and allowances. 
Æ For two-adult households, 60 per cent of total income is assumed to be from adult 
male employment and 40 per cent from adult female employment. It is assumed 
that no other family members’ income is relevant for loan eligibility. 
4. Income tax computations: 
Æ Income tax rates are based on personal tax rates for the 2009–10 financial year. 
Æ Tax rates are based on withholding rates for pay-as-you-go and do not include 
amounts credited or debited for taxation financial reconciliation such as the 
Medicare levy or low income tax offset. The computations also exclude tax 
deductions that are household specific, such as those for length of tax year, higher 
education payments and the private health insurance offset. However, there are a 
number of income-based tax credits and benefits that are not household specific 
and can be included in the computations (see 5). 
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 5. Income-based tax benefits and credits: 
The value of the following benefits has been computed, with the specifics differing by 
household type as Table A1 below shows and the accompanying text explains further. 
Consistent with Australian Government policy, Newstart is based on disposable 
income while Family Tax Benefits are based on annual gross income. 
Table A1: Relevant tax benefits and credits for sample household types 
Household Type Newstart Family Tax Benefit 
Part A 
Family Tax Benefit 
Part B 
Single person √ X X 
Sole parent, 1 child √ √ √ 
Couple, no children √ X X 
Couple, 2 children √ √ √ 
Æ Sole person household: 
Not eligible for Family Benefits, and the $30 000 income cut-off means that no single 
persons are eligible for Newstart as it ceases at a disposable income of $853.34 per 
fortnight for single persons. Lowering of the cut-off to, say, $20 000, would require 
computation of Newstart for this household group. 
Æ Couple household: 
Newstart allowance is paid up to an individual disposable income of $779.17 per 
fortnight and reduces at a greater rate once one of the partners exceeds this amount. 
Once the combined incomes exceed $45 000 the couple is no longer eligible for any 
Newstart allowance. 
Æ Sole parent household with child: 
Minimum income level is too high to consider Newstart allowance, but Family Tax 
Benefit Payment of $156.94 per fortnight is paid in full until income reaches $44 165, 
thereafter decreasing on a sliding scale until the upper limit of $99 000 is reached. 
Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTBB) of $93.10 per fortnight is paid up to primary earner’s 
maximum annual income of $150 000. Many sole parents will receive child support, 
but because this relates to individual circumstances it cannot be taken into account. 
Æ Couple household with two children: 
This household type is eligible for Newstart up to $45 000, above which the couple is 
no longer eligible for any Newstart allowance. Family Tax Benefit Part A of $313.88 
per fortnight is paid in full until combined income reaches $44 165 and then decreases 
on a sliding scale until the upper limit of $107 000. 
Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTBB): The maximum payment of this benefit is $93.10 per 
fortnight, and is based on the ‘non-primary earner’ if the primary earner’s annual 
income is below $150 000. As it is based on the income of the non-primary earner, 
FTBB is no longer paid once the couple’s combined income reaches $42 000. 
6. Computation of Maximum Affordable Housing Cost: 
Æ Disposable Income equals Gross Household Adult Income from Employment 
minus taxes plus tax benefits and credits. 
Æ Maximum Affordable Housing Cost equals Disposable Income minus indexed 
normative budget standard (minimum adequate residual income) for Non-Housing 
Consumption including Utilities (home energy). 
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 7. Computation of Maximum Affordable Mortgage Payment: 
Æ Subtract assumed non-mortgage housing costs excluding utilities from Maximum 
Affordable Housing Cost. 
8. Computation of Maximum Affordable Mortgage: 
Æ Compute present value (PV) of stream of Maximum Affordable Mortgage 
Payments at assumed annual average interest rate over assumed term. 
9. Computation of Maximum Affordable Purchase Price: 
Æ Divide Maximum Affordable Purchase Price by assumed loan-to-value ratio (one 
minus deposit ratio). 
10. Computation of Minimum Necessary Savings to Purchase: 
Æ Necessary deposit equals assumed deposit ratio times Maximum Affordable 
Purchase Price. 
Æ Compute stamp duty based on Maximum Affordable Purchase Price. 
Æ Add non-variable fees (legal etc.) to results of ‘a’ plus ‘b’ to produce Minimum 
Necessary Savings. 
11. Computation of Number and Percentage of Sold Homes Actually 
Affordable: 
Æ Utilise Valuer General’s sales price data for the most recent year, supplied by 
DPCD. 
Æ Compute the number and percentage of homes sold for an amount less than or 
equal to the Maximum Affordable Purchase Price. 
12. Produce Graphs: 
Æ For each household type. 
Æ For the full range of incomes. 
Æ Based on low cost and modest but adequate non-housing standards. 
Æ Of results of computations in Steps 6–11 above.  
Illustrative home purchase examples 
In order to demonstrate the utility of the Residual Income Home Purchaser 
Affordability Model, a few illustrative examples have been run, based upon the 
parameters specified in the following Table A2. 
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 Table A2: User set parameters 
Month and year September 2009 
Consumer Price Index for selected month and year: 
All items excluding housing and financial and insurance 
services (CPI, Table 8, line 28) 
169.7 
Utilities (CPI, Table 7, line 69) 221.2 
Loan term (years) 25 
Interest rate 6% 
Additional housing costs per year $3000 
Deposit 10% 
Legal fees $1000 
A comparison has been made with the mortgage interest rate changed to 9 per cent, 
keeping all other parameters unchanged. This variation provides a basic sensitivity 
analysis of changing interest rates on home purchaser affordability. 
For the illustrative examples, and any cases for the same month and year, the non-
housing consumption standards (minimum adequate residual income) would be 
unaltered by variations in the other parameters. The amounts of these standards for 
the four specified household types on the indexed SPRC low cost and modest but 
adequate budgets are as shown in Table A3. 
Table A3: Indexed SPRC Budgets, non-housing consumption standard, September 2009 
 Single Sole parent one 
child 
Couple Couple with two 
children 
 Low 
cost 
Modest Low 
cost 
Modest Low 
cost 
Modest Low 
cost 
Modest 
Non-
housing 
less 
energy 
$221 $320 $283 $492 $337 $524 $533 $829 
Energy $13 $15 $13 $21 $18 $21 $24 $28 
Total non-housing consumption: 
Per week $235 $335 $297 $513 $355 $545 $558 $857 
Per year $12,200 $17,400 $15,400 $26,700 $18,400 $28,400 $29,000 $44,500
The numbers imply that a single person of a given disposable income living at the 
modest standard for non-housing items could afford $100 a week less for housing 
than if they were living at the low cost standard for non-housing items. 
For a sole parent with one child, the differential in the standard of adequacy for non-
housing costs is much greater, $216 a week, due to the considerably higher standard, 
and hence greater costs, in the modest budget associated with having a child. That is, 
for a given level of disposable income, at the modest non-housing standard they could 
afford $216 a week less for housing than at the low cost standard. 
For the couple household, the differential is $190 a week. For a couple with two 
children, it is $300 a week. 
The differential affordability implications of the low cost versus modest non-housing 
standards only apply to a specific household type of a given disposable income. No 
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 comparisons are possible based on gross incomes without taking into account the 
differential effects of taxes and income-based government tax credits and benefits, 
which are essential parts of the following, more detailed summaries. They are 
provided for two of the four proto-typical household types: a single person and a 
couple with two children. 
In the following examples, ‘gross income’ means total annual household income from 
adult employment. 
Single person 
Maximum affordable total housing cost and mortgage payment 
The maximum amount that a household of a given type and income can afford is 
independent of the loan characteristics, depending only upon the non-housing 
consumption standard and the magnitude of taxes and income-based government 
credits and benefits. 
The results of this portion of the analysis for a single person household are 
summarised in Figures A1 through A3 below. The maximum affordable housing cost 
rises steadily with income, not only in dollars as would be expected for any 
affordability standard, but also as a percentage of income, revealing the folly of trying 
to set any single percentage of income or a few categorical percentages as an 
affordability standard.  
Note that the percentage graphs tend to level off at high incomes. The reason is that 
at higher incomes, for each additional dollar of gross income, approximately 40 cents 
goes for taxes with the remaining 60 cents potentially available for additional housing 
cost.  
In terms of mortgage affordability, assuming quite low non-mortgage costs of about 
$250 a month, a single person with: 
Gross income of $35 000 a year could afford a monthly mortgage payment of: 
Æ A little under $1300 a month on the low cost standard. 
Æ About $850 on the modest standard.  
Gross income of $50 000 could afford a mortgage payment of: 
Æ About $2160 a month on the low cost standard. 
Æ About $1730 on the modest standard. 
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 Figure A1: Maximum affordable housing cost, single person household 
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Figure A2: Maximum affordable debt service cost, single person household g
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Figure A3: Maximum affordable debt service cost from disposable income, single 
person household 
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Purchase affordability with mortgage interest rate of 6 per cent 
Figure A4 below shows the maximum affordable mortgage loan based on: (a) the 
maximum affordable mortgage payments, as just described; (b) assumed mortgage 
term of 25 years; (c) assumed average annual interest rate of 6 per cent.  
Gross income of $35 000 a year could afford a loan of: 
Æ $200 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $133 000 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $50 000 a year could afford a loan of: 
Æ $336 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $268 000 on the modest standard. 
Figure A4: Maximum affordable mortgage loan, single person household 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate. 
Figure A5 below shows the maximum affordable purchase price based on: (a) the 
loan amount just presented; and (b) assumed loan-to-value ratio of 90 per cent (initial 
deposit of 10%). 
Gross income of $35 000 could afford a price of: 
Æ $222 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $147 000 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $50 000 could afford a price of: 
Æ $373 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $298 000 on the modest standard. 
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 Figure A5: Maximum affordable purchase price, single person household 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Figure A6 below shows the minimum savings necessary to cover the initial costs of 
purchasing a house at the maximum affordable price, including: (a) the assumed 
deposit requirement; and (b) other initial costs, including stamp duty and legal costs.  
Gross income of $35 000 would need at least: 
Æ $30 700 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $19 500 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $50 000 would need at least: 
Æ $53 300 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $42 100 on the modest standard. 
The necessary minimum savings are lower on the modest budget non-housing 
standard because the maximum affordable purchase price is less than on the low cost 
standard. 
Figure A6: Minimum necessary savings, single person household g , , p
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Purchase affordability with mortgage interest rate of 9 per cent 
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 Figure A7 below shows with a gross income of $35 000, the maximum affordable loan 
would be: 
Æ $153 000 on the low cost standard, $47 000 less than if the interest rate was 6 per 
cent. 
Æ $102 000 on the modest standard, $31 000 less than at 6 per cent interest.  
The maximum affordable purchase price would be: 
Æ $170 000 on the low cost standard, $52 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
Æ $113 000 on the modest standard, $34 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
With a gross income of $50 000, the maximum affordable loan would be: 
Æ $258 000 on the low cost standard, $78 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
Æ $206 000 on the modest standard $62 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
The maximum affordable purchase price would be: 
Æ $286 000 on the low cost standard, $87 000 than at 6 per cent. 
Æ $229 000 on the modest standard, $59 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
Figure A7: Maximum affordable purchase price, single person household 
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Note: 9 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Greater Melbourne affordable properties 
The most recent comprehensive Valuer General’s property sales price data is for 
2008 (although 2009 data will be used in the Final Report). Figures A8 and A9 below 
show the percentage of 2008 property sales (houses and flats combined) affordable 
based on current residual income affordability for a single person household if 
financed with a mortgage interest rate of 6 per cent, deposit of 10 per cent.  
With a gross income of $35 000 a year: 
Æ On the low cost non-housing standard, fewer than 10 per cent of properties in 
Inner, Middle and Outer Melbourne were affordable, and just 15 per cent in so-
called ‘growth areas’. 
Æ On the modest standard, no properties were affordable in any parts of Greater 
Melbourne. 
With a gross income of $50 000 a year: 
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 Æ On the low cost standard, about 30 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle 
Melbourne were affordable, about 60 per cent in Outer Melbourne, and about 80 
per cent in growth areas. 
Æ On the modest standard, fewer than 20 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle 
Melbourne were affordable, about a third of properties in Outer Melbourne, and a 
little under 60 per cent in growth areas. 
Figure A8: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to single person household, 
low-cost housing standard 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Figure A9: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to single person household, 
modest non-housing standard 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
If the interest rate was 9 per cent, the share of affordable properties would be far 
lower, as shown in Figures A10 and A11 below. With a gross income of $35 000 a 
year, a single person could have afforded no properties in any part of Greater 
Melbourne, even on the low cost standard for non-housing items, let alone the modest 
standard. 
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 With an income of $50 000, on the low cost standard this household could have 
afforded about 15 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle Melbourne, i.e. only half 
the share they could have afforded at an interest rate of 6 per cent. In Outer 
Melbourne, just 30 per cent would have been affordable, and 50 per cent in growth 
areas; in both of these areas the share affordable was fully 30 percentage points 
lower than at the lower mortgage rate of 6 per cent. 
On the modest standard, an income of $50 000 would have given this household 
access to fewer than 10 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle Melbourne, only 
about 10 per cent in Outer Melbourne, and fewer than 20 per cent even in growth 
areas. 
Figure A10: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to single person household, 
low-cost non-housing standard 
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Note: 9 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Figure A11: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to single person household, 
modest non-housing standard 
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Note: 9 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit 
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 Couple with two children 
Maximum affordable total housing cost and mortgage payment 
The results of this portion of the analysis for a couple with two children are 
summarised in Figures A12 through A15 below.  
In terms of mortgage affordability, assuming quite low non-mortgage costs of about 
$250 a month, a couple with two children and with: 
Gross income of $50 000 a year could afford a monthly mortgage payment of: 
Æ $1600 a month on the low cost standard. 
Æ $316 on the modest standard.  
Gross income of $75 000 could afford a mortgage payment of: 
Æ About $2900 a month on the low cost standard. 
Æ About $1600 on the modest standard. 
Figure A12: Maximum affordable housing cost, couple with two children 
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 Figure A13: Maximum affordable housing cost from disposable income, couple with two 
children 
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Figure A14: Maximum affordable debt service cost, couple with two children 
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 Figure A15: Maximum affordable debt service cost from disposable income, couple with 
two children 
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Purchase affordability with mortgage interest rate of 6 per cent 
Figure A16 below shows the maximum affordable mortgage loan based on: (a) 
maximum affordable mortgage payments, as just described; (b) assumed mortgage 
term of 25 years; (c) assumed average annual interest rate of 6 per cent.  
Gross income of $50 000 a year could afford a loan of: 
Æ $250 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $49 000 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $75 000 a year could afford a loan of: 
Æ $448 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $248 000 on the modest standard. 
Figure A16: Maximum affordable mortgage loan, couple with two children 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate 
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 Figure A17 below shows the maximum affordable purchase price based on: (a) the 
loan amount just presented; and (b) assumed loan-to-value ratio of 90 per cent (initial 
deposit of 10%). 
Gross income of $50 000 could afford a price of: 
Æ $277 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $55 000 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $75 000 could afford a price of: 
Æ $498 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $275 000 on the modest standard. 
Figure A17: Maximum affordable purchase price, couple with two children 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Figure A18 below shows minimum savings necessary to cover the initial costs of 
purchasing a house at the maximum affordable price, including: (a) the assumed 
deposit requirement; and (b) other initial costs, including stamp duty and legal costs.  
Gross income of $50 000 would need at least: 
Æ $39 000 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $7500 on the modest standard. 
Gross income of $75 000 would need at least: 
Æ $72 700 on the low cost standard. 
Æ $38 700 on the modest standard. 
The necessary minimum savings are lower on the modest budget non-housing 
standard because the maximum affordable purchase price is less than on the low cost 
standard. 
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 Figure A18: Minimum necessary savings, couple with two children p , , p
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Purchase affordability with mortgage interest rate of 9 per cent 
With a gross income of $50 000: 
The maximum affordable loan would be: 
Æ $192 000 on the low cost standard, $58,000 less than if the interest rate was 6 per 
cent. 
Æ $39 000 on the modest standard.  
The maximum affordable purchase price would be: 
Æ $213 000 on the low cost standard, $64 000 less than at the 6 per cent interest 
rate. 
Æ $42 000 on the modest standard. 
With a gross income of $75 000: 
The maximum affordable loan would be: 
Æ $344 000 on the low cost standard, $104 000 less than at the 6 per cent interest 
rate. 
Æ $190 000 on the modest standard, $58 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
The maximum affordable purchase price would be: 
Æ $382 000 on the low cost standard, $116 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
Æ $211 000 on the modest standard, $64 000 less than at 6 per cent. 
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 Figure A 19: Maximum affordable purchase price, couple with two children 
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Note: 9 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Greater Melbourne affordable properties 
Figures A20 and A21 below show the percentage of 2008 property sales (houses and 
flats combined) affordable based on current residual income affordability for a couple 
with two children aiming to purchase with a mortgage interest rate of 6 per cent, 
deposit of 10 per cent.  
With a gross income of $50 000 a year: 
Æ On the low cost non-housing standard, fewer than 15 per cent of properties in 
Inner and Middle Melbourne, 25 per cent in Outer Melbourne, 46 per cent in 
growth areas were affordable. 
Æ On the modest standard, no properties were affordable in any parts of Greater 
Melbourne. 
With a gross income of $75 000 a year: 
Æ On the low cost standard, about 54 per cent of properties in Inner, 60 per cent in 
Middle Melbourne, 86 per cent in Outer Melbourne, and nearly all in growth areas 
were affordable. 
Æ On the modest standard, fewer than 15 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle 
Melbourne, 25 per cent in Outer Melbourne, and 45 per cent in growth areas were 
affordable. 
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 Figure A20: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to couple with children, low-
cost non-housing standard 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
Figure A21: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to couple with children, 
modest non-housing standard 
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Note: 6 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
If interest rates were 9 per cent, the share of affordable properties would be far lower, 
as shown in Figure A22 below. With a gross income of $50 000 a year, a couple with 
two children could have afforded no more than 10 per cent of properties in any part of 
Greater Melbourne on the low cost standard for non-housing items, and none on the 
modest standard. 
With an income of $75 000, on the low cost standard, they could have afforded about 
35 per cent of properties in Inner and Middle Melbourne. In Outer Melbourne, 66 per 
cent would have been affordable, and 85 per cent in growth areas. The share 
affordable in all areas was about 15 to 20 percentage points lower than if the 
mortgage rate was 6 per cent. 
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 On the modest standard, an income of $75 000 would have given them access to 
fewer than 7 per cent of properties in Inner, Middle and Outer Melbourne, and only 11 
per cent in growth areas. 
Figure A22: Percentage of 2008 property sales affordable to couple with children 
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Note: 9 per cent interest rate and 10 per cent deposit. 
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 APPENDIX B 
The assumptions required to construct home purchase price points are: 
Æ Home purchase based on a 7 per cent interest rate and a 25-year loan. 
Æ For a sole parent, the child’s age is eight. 
Æ For a couple, the children’s ages are eight and ten. 
Æ All adults are assumed to be 40 years of age. 
Æ The 30/40 rule for gross includes government credits (only applies to households 
with children). 
Æ Income tax and benefits are based on 1 July 2010. 
Æ Assumed savings include stamp duty, deposit and legal fees of $1000. 
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APPENDIX C 
The assumptions required to construct renting price points are: 
Æ For a sole parent, the child’s age is eight. 
Æ For a couple, the children’s ages are eight and ten. 
Æ All adults are assumed to be 40 years of age. 
Æ The 30/40 rule for gross includes government credits (only applies to households 
with children). 
Æ Rental amounts for modest budget standard, 30/40 rule gross and nett includes 
rent assistance for households with children (added after the rent has been 
established). 
Æ Income tax and benefits are based on 1 July 2010. 
Æ The Office of Housing rent amount does not take into account the market rent cut-
off. 
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